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ON DIFFERENCE AND EQUALITY 
Cynthia V. Ward 
Arizona State University 
The concept of "difference" forms the core of contemporary attacks on 
"liberallegalism"l and is central to proposals for replacing it. 2 Critics charge 
that liberal law quashes ditIerence because it grounds political equality and 
individual rights in the assumption that all persons share certain "same-
nesses," such as rationality or autonomy. In the words of the philosopher 
Iris Marion Young, "liberal individualism denies difference by positing the 
self as a solid, self-sufficient unity, not defined by or in need of anything or 
anyone other than itself."3 The claim is that this "sameness"-based vision of 
equality is in fact an exercise of power, reflecting a highly specific model of 
personhood that was constructed by and for a white male elite and nsures 
I am grateful lO Bruce Ackerman, Jeffrie Murphy, Fernando Teson, and the facully at the 
College of William and Mary for valuable comments. 
1. The phrase "liberal legalism " describes a system of law grounded in the principles of 
liberal phi losophy; as used in feminist and critical-race theory it has become a term of 
opprobrium. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, When (I StOlY IsJust a Sto')': Does Voicp Really M(lUer?, 76 
VA. l.. REv. 95, 103 (1990) (expressing frustration of critical-race theorislS with premises of 
liberal legal ism); Catharine MacKinnon , TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 170 (1989) 
("Including, but beyond, the bourgeois in liberal legal ism, lies what i, male about it "); Robin 
West, Jurisprudence and CenclPt', 55 U. CH I. L. REv. 1 (1988) (arguing that liberal legal ism is 
"essentially and irretrievably masculine ") . 
2. Discussions of "difference " abound in feminist and critical-race theory, as well as in 
poslmodern literature generally. See, e.g., Anne Dailey, Feminism s Retum to Libemlism, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1265 (1993) (discussing importance of "difference" question in feminist jurisprudence); 
Sheila Foster, DijJenmce (l7ui Equ(llity: A Cli/iad AJ.\·essment oj the unaj)/ 0/ "Div;:/J-;t); " 1993 WIS. L. 
REV. 105 [hereinafter FOSler, DiJ//!Tence and Equality); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The J1l1'ispru-
dence of R£(.(mstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 741 (1994) ; Iris Marion Young, Polity and Omup 
DijJermce, 99 ETHICS 250 (1989); Iris Marion Young, The ideal of Community alld the Politics of 
Difference, in FE~UNISM/POSTMODERNISM 300 (Linda J. icholson cd.) (1990) [hereinafter 
Young, 71 .. ideal 0/ Comm.unity]; Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engtmdered, 101 HMv. L. REv. 
10 (1987); Martha Minow, When Dlf/erence Ha" Its Home: Group Homes /or the Mell tolly Reto·rded, 
Equal Protectioll (lnd Legal Treatment o/Dif/erence, 22 HARV. C. R. C. L. L. Rt:;v. I II (1987); Martha 
Minow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, .".ND AAEIUCAS LAw (1990) [herein-
after Minow, Making all the DifJerence); Iris Marion Young, J USTICE AND THE POUTICS Of DIFFER-
ENCE (1990) [hereinafter Young, Justice and the Politics 0/ Difference). 
3. Young, The Meal 0/ Communit)\ .",pra note 2, at 307. See also Minow, M([ki1lg AUthp Differencl', 
supm note 2, at 377 ("Righ ts analysis . .. fai ls to supply a basis for remaking ... institutions to 
accommodate difference. Integrated into institutions not designed with them in mind, for-
merly marginalized people may simply become newly marginalized or stigmatized"). As I 
discu.s..' below, mOst critics (including Young) attack a specific type of liberalism, which cele-
brates individual autonomy and agency and advocates their maximization via a legal system 
grounded in individual tights. Thus, not all forms of liheralism are subje<;l to all of the 
ctiticisms made here. See infm note 13 and accompanying text. 
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its continued social dominance.4 Liberalism's cntlcs conclude that the 
achievement of social justice will be possible only when sameness-based 
conceptions of equality are rejected.5 
Their argument launches two foundational attacks on liberal theory. 
First, the charge that liberalism "denies difference" is the primary means by 
which critical theorists contest liberalism's commitment to equality. Second, 
that charge appears to contradict the claim that liberal socie ties maximize 
"diversity" by allowing all individuals the largest possible quantity of free-
dom to live out their own particular visions of the good life. In response to 
critics like Young, for example, liberal theorist William Galston argues that 
"purposive liberalism ... comes closer than any other form of human asso-
ciation, past or present, to accommodating human differences. It is 'repres-
sive' not in comparison with available alternatives but only in relation to 
unattainable fantasies of perfect liberation. "6 
The legal and political outcomes of this dispute could be dramatic, for 
"difference" theorists translate their challenges to liberalism into reform 
proposals that could require substantial restructuring of liberal political 
and legal institutions. Martha Minow, for example, advocates a restructur-
ing of rights in ways that would de-emphasize their autonomy-protecting 
function and instead help to preserve relationships and empathic, differ-
ence-respecting dialogue.7 Sheila Foster claims that "we must establish 
institutional participatory patterns that accept and value the contributions 
4. See, e.g. , Christine A. Littleton , Reconstrncting Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1282 
(1987) ("As a concept, equality suffers from a 'mathematical fallacy'-lhal is, the view that only 
things that are the same can ever be equal"); Minow, Making all the DijJer-ence, supra note 2, at 
149 ("Both the historical and heuristic versions of [Iiberall social contract theory claim to be 
inclusive, participatory, and egalitarian, yet both replicate the process of exclusion and subor-
dination that preserves the two tracks of legal treaunent"); id. (noting that 'The U.S. Consti-
tution l is ba~ed on liberal principles and ] is a document pcoduced t11rough an indisputably 
exclusionary process"); Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, su.pm note 2, at 164-66 
(claiming that "politics of difkrence .. . promotes a notion of group solidar'ity against the 
individualism ofliberal humanism,"which is characterized by an "assimi lationist ideal" that sets 
facially neutral "norms" that in fact disadvantage oppressed groups). 
5. Harris, .Jurisprudence oj Rewnst'YUction, supra note 2, at 76 1 (critical-race theorists advance 
an idea of "equality based not on sameness but on difference"; id. at 770 (critical-race theory 
attempts to refigure equality in ways beyond sameness and difTerence); Minow, When Difference 
Has Its Home, supra note 2, a t 113 (explaining main goal of article is to argue that "categorical 
approaches" to law. which attribute "difference" to different people, undermine commitments 
to equali ty); Minow, Making All the DijJerence, supra note 2, at 50, 74-75 (contesting idea of 
equality as sameness); Young, Po/it), and Group Differenre, su.pra note 2, at 250-51. 
6. William Galston, I .II3ERAL PURPOSf~~: GOODS. VIRTUES Al D OrVERSITI IN TI-IE LI\.lERAL STATE 4 
(1991). See also Bruce Ackerman, SOCIAL J USTICE IN THE I.IBERAI. STATE 18 (1980) (advocating "a 
liberal conception of equality that is compatible wi th a social order rich in diversity of talents, 
personal ideals, and forms of community"); Ronald Dworkin , TAKING RiGHTS SER10USLY 272-73 
(1977) (defining "liberal conception of equality" as mandating that government "must not 
constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen 's conception of the good life is nobler or 
superior to another's"). 
7. Minow, Making All the DifJerl!11.CI!, su.pra note 2. at 227- 390 (defending her vision of "rights 
in rela tionship"). 
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of those d ifferences that have been left out."8 Scholars have argued that 
properly accounting for racial "difference" implies the abolishment of Title 
VII and the re imagining of the law of employment discrimination and equal 
protection.9 And Iris Marion Young proposes a "politics of diflerence" that 
would incorporate "a principle of representation for oppressed groups in 
democratic dec ision making bodies," as well as other group-based rights.lO 
In Part I of this Article I analyze the liberal value of diversity; in Parts II 
and IlI, I compare it with antiliberal concep tions of difference; in Part IV, 
I evaluate the connection of "difference," as conceived by critics of liberal 
legalism, to the unde rlying and (I argue) more fundamental value of 
equality. 
"Difference" advocates advance their legal reform proposals in the name 
of true equality-equality grounded not in sameness but in difference." 1 
conclude that, although equality can and should accommodate a wide range 
of d ifferences, these efforts to construct equality from difference eviscerate 
the concept of equal ity. To argue, as "difference" th eorists do, for the 
prioritization and celebration of equal ity based on "d ifference" is to argue 
against any foundational commitment to equali ty. To the extent it adds 
anything new to legal discussion , "difference" theory is necessarily anli-
equality. 
I. LIBERAL DIVERSITY 
Liberal tend to speak of respecting "diversity" rather than "difference ," and 
this reflects more than a semantic disagreement with their critics. 12 The two 
8. FOSler, Difference nnti t;qualit.» "upm note 2, at 156. 
9. See, e.g. , Roy L. Brooks and Mary Jo Newborn, Critical /lace Theory and Classical·Liberal Ciuil 
Rights Scholanhip: A Distinction Without a Differen(e?, 82 CAL L REV. 787. 804-44 ( 1994) . 
10. Young, j ustice (md the Politics of Diffrrence, SlIpm note 2, <ll 15S. 
11. See, e.g., Foster, D{[frrPnGe and Equali!.y, sulna note 2, <It 110- 11 (exam ining concept of 
diversity under "hybrid equality paradigm" and concl uding that "[l]O be useful in achieving 
the goal of equality, a diversity ralionale should recognize those differences that have been 
construcled into a basis for, and have resulted in , systemic exclusion and disadvantage fo r 
individuals possessing those differences. "); id. al147-61 (affirming imporlance of equality goal 
and advocating idea lh al explicil recognition of socia ll y relevant difre rences is necessary lO 
achieve il); Allan C. Ilutchinson, Identit), Cri.,,~<: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 NI'.\\' ENG. L. RH'. 
1173, 1192 (1992) (on postmodern view of difTerence, "the subjecl becomes a site for lhe 
conslant and continuing su'uggle to take on an identity thal is conducive to a u'uly egalitarian 
society"); id. at 1208 (,The triumph of a tru ly democratic politics wi ll only occur when the 
author-mon arch is finally dead and a polity of t.ru ly qual readers and "'Titers is established and 
Ij,'ed"); Young, Polity and Group Dijfrrence, iltlna nOle 2, at251 ("the inclusion and participa tjon 
of everyone in public discussion and decision making requires mechanisms for group repre-
sentation "); Young, jltstice and the Politics o/Difference, mpm note 2, al 173 (assuming lhal "(a I 
goal of social justice . . . is social equality," which "refers primarily to the fu ll participation and 
inclusion of everyone in a society'S major institutions, and the socially supported substantive 
opportuni ty for all to develop and exercise their capaci ties and realize their choices"). 
12. The term "diversity" is a lso ,,~dely employed to refer to efforts by privale and public 
entities to hire women and memhers of rac ial and ethnic minorit.ies. "Diversi ty" is thus a 
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ideas have significantly dissimilar content, and in the ensuing discussion I 
examine and compare them. 
A. Content of Liberal Diversity 
Although they often fail to acknowledge it, contemporary "difference" 
theorists do not really attack liberalism per se, but only those versions of 
liberal thought that assume the presence of threshold levels of rationality, 
autonomy, and/ or agency in all human individuals and draw from this 
foundational assumption the political conclusion that equal, and individ-
ual , rights ought to form the basis and the boundaries of the state. However, 
since autonomy- and rationali ty-based liberal theories abound,13 such criti-
cisms have potential power. 
All students of liberalism are familiar with the slogan that a liberal state 
must allow each person the greatest possible freedom to pursue his or her 
vision of the good life. 14 This principl e derives directly from two underlying 
assumptions; first, that people are importantly the same, and therefore 
deserve an equal opportunity to choose and direct their lives l 5; and second, 
that people are also importantly different, which means that, given an equal 
description of a particula r justification for aflirmatjve action in hiring, a justification that 
focuses on the benefits to the hiring organizations and/ or society at large 01' including within 
these organizations members of previously unrepresented, or underrepresented groups. This 
pol itical meaning of diversity should be d istinguished both from the theoretical claims of 
liberafism outlined above, and from t.he discussion below of difference theory. Indeed, the 
diversity rationale for am"mative action is para.'itie upon a socie ty's p,;or decisions as to what 
difference is and which d ifferences do, or should, mat ter. See, e.g., F ost.er, DifJerenr.e and EqlU1.lil)\ 
supra note 2, a t 109 ("Diversity has been used as a code word for a variety of difTerences"); it/. 
at 111 ("the current concept of diversity is 'empty' because it lacks a mediating principle. By 
U'eating all differen -es the same, it ignores the 'salience' of certain diffe rences in this ~ociety 
by extracting differences from their sociopol itical contexts"). 
13. See, e.g., Ackerman, SIlpm note 6, at 182, 196 (explaining importance of autonomy in 
liberaf theory); ill. a t 4-7 (outlining conception of rational it)' that forms basis for amhor's own 
brand of liberalism); Rich ard H. Fal lon Jr., Two Senses oj Au/onomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875, 876 
(1994) ("A view tracing to Kant majntains that o ther va lues possess their worth only because 
r<ltional, autonomous agents find them worth pursuing."); J ohn Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
515-16 (197 1) ("Following tlle Kantian in terpretation of justice as fa irness, we can say that by 
acting from these principles [of justice] persons are acting autonomously: they are ac ting from 
principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free 
and rationaf beings ... . Thus, moral education is education for autonomy"). 
14. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 6, a t 54-55 (articulating requi rement that liberaf princi-
ple of neutrality "does not distinguish the merits of competing concep tions of the Good "); 
Gafston, supra note 6, at J 0 ("the libe t'al conception of the good . .. allows for a wide though 
not wholly unconstrained pluralism among ways of life. It assumes that ind ividuals have special 
(though not wholly unerring) insight into their own good . And it is consistent with the 
minimization ofpubJi c resU'aints on indh~dllals "); Rawls, wpm note 13, at 92-93 ("[AJ person's 
good is determined by what is for him Ihe most rational long-term plan of life . . . . To put it 
briefl y, tlle good is the satisfac tion of rationa l desire"). 
15. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AtrrONOMY 31 (1988) ("Moral 
respect is owed to a.ll because a ll have tlle capacity for defini ng tllemsclves"). 
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chance to choose, their actual choices ,\~I\ vary 16 Because liberalism posits 
normatively that all people h ave equal moral worth, the em pirical fact of 
human difference mandates respect for each person 's "right to be differ-
ent" and to have his differences tolerated by o thers.17 
Three relevant conclusions follow from this. First, liberal diversity theory 
does not rely upon any particular account of the source of hum an dive rsi ty. 
By imply accepting human difference as a given and fitting respect for it 
within the general rubric of liberal equality th ory, liberali m sidesteps 
continuing debates over the comparative responsibility of biology and social 
construction for human behavior and personality. The vel-sion of liberalism 
discussed here merely assum s that, what ver th source and extent of 
difference, adult human beings possess at least some autonomous control 
over important life choices. III 
Second , in an important sense liberal diversity is a derivative value; that is, 
its normative status in liberal theory proceeds from the liberal's primary 
respect for the equalily of individuals, a respect that when married to the 
empirical fact of human dilIerences requires the liberal to value diversity 
and to create the political condition of individual freedom through which 
to recogniz it. 19 Because humans are the same in certain ways, they must be 
given an equal chance to live their lives to the fullest; and beca use humans 
are also importantly different, an equal chance mandates indi\~dual free-
dom and a respect for diversity_ Note that the strength of this diversity value 
can range, consist ot with this conclusion, fro m mere toleration to affirm-
ative respe t and admiration for difference. hat is, a liberal can consis-
tently take either the view that her own way of life is bes t but the different 
cho ices of oth ers must be accommodated because, as indi~duals possessi ng 
16. See, e. g., John Stuart Mill , ON Ll BER't"Y: ANNOTATED TE:XT, SOURCES. AN D BACKGROUND 
CRITICISM 65 (David Spitz ed. 1975) ("Such are the differences among human beings in the ir 
sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain , and the opera tion on them of different 
physical and mora l agencics, that unless thcre is a corresponding diversi ly in their modes of 
life, they neither obtain thcir fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and 
aesthetic statu re of which their nature is capablc·'); Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE. AND 
UTOPIA 308-{)9 ( 1974) (discussing extensive d iversity of human beings); Amartya Sen, IN-
EQ AUTY REEXAM INED 19- 21 (1992) (discussing impact of "extensive human d iversi ty" on 
equality theory) . 
.17. See, e.g., Michel Ro enfelrl , Substantive Equa.tily and Equal Opportunity: 1\ j utlspnuilmlial 
Appraisal, 74 C"" .. L. REv. 1687, 1702 (" In its broadest terms, then , equal ities must be con-
structed so that those who are different are nOt .-egarded as inferiors, and con forming 
identities are nOt imposed upon them .. J. 
18. .'iee, e.g. , Fallon, supra notc 13, at 887-88 (defending conception of descriptive au tonomy 
and noting tha t "lh e self, th ough sil.Uated and socially COnStilu t.ed, remains capable of apprc-
ciating her situated condition, of assessing and cri ti cizing her assumptions and values, and of 
re\~sing her goal and commitments .... The self is a crea l.Ure ill and of the world, but one 
capable of at leasl partially transforming herself through thought, cri ticism, and self-interpre-
tation"). 
19. See Sen, StljJra note 16, at 12-16 (noting that "every normative theory of social arrange-
ment lhat has at a ll slood the lest of lime seems to demand equality of sOlllethi71g--someth ing 
tha t is regarded as part.icularly important in that theor y," and thus that "th e battle is nOl, in an 
important sense, about 'why equality?' , but aboul 'equali ty of what?'"). 
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autonomy, agency, or whatever, they have the right to be wrong, or the view 
that there are many equally valuable "visions of the good life," and that she 
should therefore be encouraging to, and welcoming of, visions that differ 
from her own. Both approaches assume a value for diversity that follows 
coherently from a liberal understanding of equal respect for individual 
personhood. 
Third, liberal equality serves as both the value that grounds respect for 
diversity and as the boundary to diversity. One's right to pursue one's own 
vision of life, which derives from the liberal's equal respect for all people, 
is simultaneously limited by the equal right of everyone else to do the same. 
"To each his own" is a liberal sentiment that does not apply to persons 
whose vision of self-maximization requires the murder or torture of others. 
In short, liberal respect for diversity is both derivative of, and subservient 
to, the foundational liberal value of (sameness-based) equality. Ov r time, 
however, the exact relationship betvveen these tvvo values has shifted, driv-
ing liberalism toward visions of equality that hav continued to embrace 
foundational sameness but have also increasingly acknowledged the pro-
fundity of human difference. 
B. Diversity and Liberal Equalities 
It is important to distinguish betvveen tvvo relevant meanings of equality. 
The first refers to equality as a distributive principle, as a particular means of 
implementing a deeper equality ideal-via libertarian "equal rights,"20 or 
equal distribution of resources,21 or of primary goods,22 etc. At this level the 
argument is not over whether human beings are the same (and therefore 
equal) in some descriptive sense, but ov r which form of egalitarian distri-
bution of resources will best serve an already accepted equali ty premise.23 
The second meaning of equality refers to the just~fication of political and 
legal egalitarianism, advancing an answer to the question , Why should we 
arrange society and law so as to guarantee equal distribution of 
----
resource (s) ?24 
20. See, e.g., id. at 22 ("Libertarian demands for liberty typically include important featmes 
of 'equal liberty,' e.g., the insistence on equal immuni ty from interference by othel·s"). 
21. Ronald Dworkin, What Is Etl'lalil)'~ Part 1: Equality QJWelfare, and What Is Equality? Part 2: 
Equality oj &sources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFr. ( 1981). 
22. Rawls, supra note 13. 
23. Amy Gutmann may be drawing this distinction between liberalism 's equality a.numptions, 
which she defines as the function of "describing people as equal beings ... ," and ega.litarian-
ism. which she defines as the justifying a more equ<ll distribution of goods, services, and 
opportunities among those people." Amy Gutmann, LIBERAL EQUALHY2 (1980). 
24. Amartya Sen, supra note 16, at 12-30, discusses these two ideas, noting that "[ tlwo 
central issues for ethical analysis of equality are: (1) Why equality? (2) Equality of What?" 
Discussing the work of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin notes a similar difference between Rawls's 
two conceptions of equality, which consist of claims with respect to the disu'ibution of goods, 
and claims to equal concern and respect for all individuals, Dworkin, sul,ra note 6, at 180-82. 
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The connection ben.\'een these two meanings of equality has changed 
significantly within liberal theory. According to its now-standard tale, liber-
alism's earliest vision of egalitarianism found its legal expres ion in the view 
that individuals have "equal rights." This vision of legal equality, also char-
acterized by the phrases "equal treatment" and "formal equality," inter-
preted equal righ ts to mandate identical treatm ent, resulting in the 
principle that th e law may not treat similarly situated persons differently.25 
The legal princi ple of equal treatment begins from a justification of 
equality that relies on some shared trait-some "sameness"-among all 
hum ans (for example, autonomy, agency, capacity to have a vision of the 
good life and ac t upon it, or capaci ty for "moral personality"), and proceeds 
mechanically to import this "sameness" justification into the legal and 
poli ti al spheres via the principle of "equal rights." Equal treatment is based 
on the idea that, b cause people are (in relevant ways) the'ame, the law 
should treat them the same. 
Although fundamental sameness has re mained the core ju tification of 
liberal equality, the sameness-based egalita rian principle has been succeeded 
by a myriad of reformul ations of the meaning of legal and political egalitari-
anism, among wh ich (Ire the closely related principles of "equal concern, "26 
"equal a ep tan ce,"~7 and "equal opportunity. "28 These principles began to 
open a divide between the sameness-based justification for legal equality and 
the proper means of imp Ie men Ling it. They sought legally to express the view 
that lib rallaw ho uld e ndorse different treatment for diffe rent persons in the 
service of the underlying principle that people are, in the relevant libe ral 
senses, the same. Progressive liberal theodsts argued that treating everyone 
the same necessarily e rased important and relevant differences among them. 
Although humans share autono my, they aJso have differences that make 
treatment "as an equal" in consisten t with identical treatment.29 
Two things are important about this. First, th e progression of liberalism 
discussed above worked a significant change in the re lationship between 
equality and diversity within the li beral framework. Equal treatment was 
found inadeq uate as a legal principle precise ly because it was in fundamen-
tal tension with diversity, and liberal philosophers concluded that treating 
people the same took insufficient account of th eir differences and was 
therefore a viol.al.ion of liberal equali ty properly conceived. 
Second, the liberal progression from equal treatment to a mandate of 
"treatment as equals" allered the relationship between equality as justitica-
25. See. e.g .. A kcrman . sujml no te G, at 18 ("Ccn a in forms of eq ual u'eaUllCnl-say. formal 
equali ty in th > adm inistration of justice-have been cenlral LO the libera l u·adition"). For a 
conte1l1porary defcnse of this idea. see gel!l'mJ/y ozick, supra. notc 16. 
26. Dworkin , supra note 6. at 180.272-78. 
27. LiuJcton . supra no te 4, at 1284-85. 
28. Hel'llla Ilill Kay, Ef/u(llily (lml Dif!n'f' ll rP: The C(l.~P!f P"'gllfll1.C)1 I BERKELEy WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 
26-27 ( 1985). 
29. Dworkin , ""I)m note 6. at 180-82. 
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tion and equality as a di tributiv principle. The changes within lib ralism 
have d monstrated that a sameness-based justification of equaliLy doe not 
necessarily imply egalitarian tr atment, but can mandate different treat-
ment for those with sp cial ne ds JIO 
Thus, critical attacks on liberalism for advocating equali ty based on 
~sameness" do not inherently engag liberal distributive principles- which 
are now fully compatible with the id a of different treatment. The attacks 
must therefore addres only the liberal justification that those distributiv 
principles grow out of some basic samen ss-rationality, autonomy, or 
whatever-shar d by humans as humans. 
It is true that justifications of liberal prin iples of I gal equali ty, even in 
th ir progressiv modes, are ultimately grounded in descriptive assump-
tions of human sameness. Asked why peopl should be "treated as equals" 
legally, the liberal replies by articulating some common faculty related to 
th capacity of persons for agency, autonomy, rationality. or a variant that 
justifies whatever v rsion of political and legal equali ty the liberal finds 
appropriat . The move from "equal treatment" to "treatment as equals" 
simply break the symmetrical connection between equality as justifica-
tion-the desCliptive sense in which all humans are the same-and politi-
cal-legal egalitarianism, which has moved from being grounded in sameness 
to th acknowledgment of difference. The failure to recognize certain 
differ nces has become a failure to treat all people as equals. Thu , a 
contemporary liberal society can justify the expenditur of public funds to 
construct sp cial sidewalk and building ramps for the physically disabled. 
although this involves treating disabled persons differently from the non-
disabled, on the principle that the disabled, as equal per ons in the sen e 
relevant to such access, deserve " qual concern and respect," which in turn 
commands equal access to the public sphere. And lib ral feminists have 
argued that equal access can mean different treatment-such as special 
workplace accommodation for pregnant women 31-that is nevertheless 
grounded in women 's fundamental sameness to men. 
30, Other forms of Iiberalism-e,g" u ti li tarian ones--demunstra,e that egal itarian treat-
ment does not require descriptive samene.ss a, its base. A liberal utilitarian might simply assert 
that equal respect for the rights and freedoms of individuals-the idea that each counts for 
one, and no more than one- maximizes utili ty, however thaL function is defined, (But why does 
it do so? 'Why does treating people equally maximize utility? B cause humans g >nerally have a 
preference to be treated equally? If so, is that in itself, or is the capacit), to experience happiness 
or uffering, an indication of some fundamental sameness? Since a "yes'· answer to that 
que tion would simply fold utilitaIianism into the general argument of this es ay, while a "no" 
answer leaves the argument untouched , I wi ll put aside u til itarianism for the moment. Bu.t see 
infm, text accompanying note 150, 
31. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 28, at 22 (proposing "episodic analysis" that would "take account 
of biologi al reproductive sex d ifferences and treat them as legally significant only when they 
ar being u til ized fo r reproductive purposes. "); id, at 27 ("in order to maintain the woman 's 
equality of opportunity during her pregnancy, we should modify as far as reasonably possible 
those aspects of ber work where her job performance is adversely affected by the pregnan cy, 
On Difference and Equa lity 73 
Still, even in its contem porary form diversity remains subservi nt to 
equality within liberalism-a fact that motivated the liberal civil-rights 
movement. Implied in the liberal convictions that equality is a valu more 
basic than diversity, and that persons are equal b cause they hare certain 
threshold capa ities, i th notion that differences among humans may not 
be used to undermine 1 gal equali ty. Indeed, for a liberal, history teaches the 
dangers of over-focusing on diffe rences. Liberals are alert, for example, to 
the human prope nsity to falsely a sume fundamental difference in the 
character, int lIigence, or p rsonali ty of others based on immutable char-
acteristics such as skin a lar, gend r, or physical handicap, which are in fact 
unrelated to the moral worth of p rsons. Lib rals have attempted to see 
through su h differenc s to the esse ntial humani ty32 of (for example) 
women, racial minorities, and h andicapped p rsons. 
In short, large groups of people, including racial minorities, women, and 
the handicapped, have in the past been miscategorized as inferior, when 
differences betvveen them and the majority have either been invented or 
translated into justifications for ignoring their claim to equal personhood. 
Th e history of lib ralism demonstrates that these miscategorizations can be 
corrected via th argument that such groups of persons share the basic 
samenesses that justify treatm n t as equals under liberal law. 
In an important e n e, liberali m 's cri tic attempt to reverse the liberal 
relation hip betw n equality and diversity. '\o\Thile liberals treat cliversity as 
subservien t to, and dependent upon, equali ty, critics of liberalism reject the 
id a that equality can or should be ba ed on an a sumption of ameness 
among all persons and emphasize instead the irreducible importance of 
human ditference.33 
II. ESSENTIALIST DIFFERENCE 
A. Sameness as Domination 
At the heart of rna t theoretical a ttacks on "liberal I galism" is the claim 
that, contrary to their xpr ss commitm nts, liberal institutions are main-
Unless we do so, she will e pelience employment disadvan tages arising from her reproduc6ve 
activity Ulat are nOt encou ntered by her male 'o-worker"); ill. (episodic analysis ~wi ll enable 
rJle law to trea t women differently than men during a limited period when their needs may be 
grea ter than those of men as a way of ensuring that women will be equal to men with respect 
to their overall enlploymel1l opportunities"); Littleton . sup-ra no te 4, at 1283 (arguing that 
"equality an be ... reconstructed as a means of challenging, rather tllan legiti mating, social 
insti tutions crea ted from the phallocentri perspective."); id. at 1284 (adva ncing notion of 
equality as accep tance and averring that "[tlo achi ve this form of sexual equality, male and 
female 'differen 'es' must be costle 's relative to each oUler"). 
32. ubddined as rational ily. capacity for moral personal ity, agency, Ctc. 
33. Mino\\', Making Aillhe Difference, .m/ml. note 2. at 146-47. 
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tained by and for a white male elite that hides its domination of society 
behind empty claims to respect the equal moral worth of all persons. ~4 Of 
course, the critics do not need to claim that liberalism suppresses all differ-
ence; they could even acknowledge that, within the constraints of its core 
assumptions about human nature-assumptions that justifY its view of 
equality-liberal theory allows the flourishing of many visions of the good 
life. 35 It is those constrain ts, howev r, that radical dirrerence theorists target 
as parochial and highly restrictive. 36 Indeed, according to this view the 
libe ral's bounded respect for "diversity" actually suppresses the acknow-
ledgment of fundamenta l "difference." 
B. The Relational " Different Voi ce" 
Reduced to its core components, the attack on liberal diversit)1 makes two 
claims. Critics charge first that lib ralism misdescribes human nature by 
assuming and celebrating individual autonomy and choi c while simultan -
ously excluding from law and politics important parts of the self such as its 
interdependence and/ or relational capac ity37; and second, that those ig-
34. See, P.g., Derrick Re ll , FOI'I!word: 7/lP Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 liAR\'. 1.. REv. 4, 6--8 (l985) 
(d iscussing conu'adiction betwet:n America's ideal of t:quali ty and its realily of racism. and 
arging that "[m ]uch of what is called the law of civil t 'ighL~ ... has a mythological or fairY-La le 
quality"); Harris, j 'lllispmd,mce oj Ummstru.f/hm, supra note 2, a l 7.'l4 (cri lical-race theory "PUI)' 
law's supposed objectivity and neutrali ty on trial, arguing that whal look. like race-neuudlity 
on the sut'fact: has a deeper structure th al rdlecLS white privilege. "); ill. at 759 ("Histor)' has 
shown that racism can coexist happi ly with formal commitments to objectivity, neutrahty, and 
colorblindness"); Catharine MacKinnon , TOWARD A FE.\.fINIST T II EO RY OF THE STATE 220-2 1 
(1989) (liberal conception of eq uality as employed in sex d iscrintimlljon law conceals "the 
substantive way in whic h man has become the mea 'ure of all things); id. ~t 224 ("Men 's 
physiology defines most SPOrtS, their health needs larg-e ly defin e insuranc!: c(}wrage, their 
socially designed biographies define workplace expectations and successful career patterns, 
their perspectives and concerns define quality in scholarship, thei r experienct:s ,md obsessions 
define merit, thei r military service defines citizenship , the ir presence defines fami ly. thei r 
inabi li ty to get along \\~th each o ther-th eir wars and rulerships-defines h isLOry, th t:ir itttage 
defines god, and their geni tals define sex. These arc the standards that are presented as gender 
neutral"); Youn g, justiCl' and thp Politics oJDiJJPTmrr, mpm note 2, at 168-69 (arguing that liberal 
quality tJleory has effect of excl uding those labeled "differen t"); irl. at 173 ("policies that are 
u niversally form ulated and thus blind to differences of race, culturt:, gender, age, or disability 
often perpetuate rather [han undennin e oppre sion "). 
35. See, e.g., Mino\\', Making All/he Dif[m'nre, Sl/lml note 2. at 146-49; Young.jus/icp lIlIl/tile 
Politics oj Difference, supra no te 2, at 157 ("Enlightenment ideal:; of liberty ami political c'luality 
did and do inspire movements against oppression and dom ination , whose success has crt:aled 
social values and institutions we wou ld not walll to lose"). 
36. See, e.g., Minow, IHakillg All the DiffeTrnrp, ""'I,m note 2. at 152 ("The [liberal] social 
contract. approach has been deeply exclusionary") ; Young, .ills/ire (lml thi' Politics vJ Di[[erI'11(1', 
supra note 2, at 173 ("Policies that are universally formulated and thus blind to differences 
of race, culture, gender, age, or disabili ty often perpetuate rather than underminc oppres-
sion"). 
37. Communi tarians have been especially kecn on tJlis attack. ,yp f(Plll'mlly Michael Sandel , 
LIBERALlS~t AND Til E LI MITS OF J USTICE (1982). 
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nored parts of the self should be both celebrated and incorporated into our 
legal institutions.38 
According to some critical scholars, the liberal focus on individual auton-
omy, while val idly descriptive of certain groups, obscures or suppresses 
other, equally worthy visions of the good that emphasize the primary impor-
tance of relational ability and connectedness. This suppression, they 
charge, has the effect in liberal societies of excluding from legal identity 
groups that hold more communitarian worldviews. Much relational femi-
nist work takes this approach, arguing, in the well-known words of Carol 
Gilligan, for the inclusion of women's "different voice"39 into morallegiti-
macy and legal institutions. 4o 
The normative implications of this relational critique of liberalism are 
clear: "liberal legalism" should either be supplemented with a legal system 
that recognizes relevant characteristics, such as relational capacity, that 
lib ral law currently ignores,4) or liberal institutions should be replaced 
altogether by a system of communitarian deliberation that celebrates more 
important features and ideals of human society.42 
38. See f?1erally Su~an na Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Co-lI.5titutional Adjudica-
tion, 72 VA. L. ReV. 543 (1986) (citing Carol Gilligan and arguing for inclusion of women's 
"different voice" into law); West, supra note 1 (arguing that law must incorporate women's 
focus on connectedness as well as men's concern with individual autonomy). 
39. Carol Gilligan, IN A OIFFE.R£NT VOI CE (1980). 
40. For relational fem inist discussions that use Gillig-an 's ideas to criticae liberal law, see, e.g., 
West, supra nOle I , at 2-4, 14-26,42 (1988) (defending the "connection tllesis"-that women 
differ essen tially from men because they are materially con nected to other human lives 
through L11e malernal experience and therefore value connection and nurturing over au ton-
omy); Sherry, supra nOle 38, at 543, 579-84 (hypothesizing that women 's concerns about 
connection, subjectivity, and responsibility for others accord well with communitarian legal 
structures while men's emphasis on autonomy, objectivity, and rights translates into liberal-
ism) . For a similar thesi ' in the context of race relations, see, e.g., Jacinda T. Townsend, 
Reclaiming Se/fDettml1in(uion: A Call/or i nlraracial AdOPti(J1l, 2 0 KEJ. GENDER L. & POL'y 173, 181 
(1995) ("The Black community maintains its own set of family values, including collective 
responsibility, self~elermination, and cooperative economics. T hese values help define a 
communi tarian Black so iely thal can be ontrasted with an individual rights based dominant 
society"). 
CaLllarine MacKinnon, a cri tic of relational feminism, might nevertheless be placed in this 
camp as she also appears to assume that although liberal autonomy and the liberal state work 
well for men, they oppress women; see, e.g., MacKinnon , supra note 34, at 157-70, 237-49 
(1989) (attacking the liberal state and liberal theory as oppressive of women ). Unlike LIle 
relational feminists, however, MacKinnon refuses to move beyond the critique ofliberalism to 
define a positive vision of "woman 's point of view"; that is, to paint a picture of what a 
posldomination world would look like. See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, FEMI ISM NMODIHED 
45 (1987) ("Take your foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue women speak"). 
Like relational feminists, MacKinnon has been attacked for "gender essentialism"; see f?1erally 
Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Them,. 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) 
( harging both MacKinnon and West wi th essentialism). 
41. See f?1erally herry, supra note 38; West, supra note 1. 
42. See, e.g. , Sandel, supra note 37 (pointing out fl aws in Rawlsian liberalism and arguing for 
a communi rarian \~sion of state). Some liberals have recently argued that liberalism and 
communitarianism are not essentially opposed; see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, WE THE PWPLE 1: 
FOUNDATIONS (1991); Wi lliam Galston, LIBERAL PURPOSES (1991) . 
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For these relational CritiCS, recognizing the importance of "ditlerence" 
per se is not really a fundamental goal at all ; for th m, a "difference" 
argument serves merely as a stalking horse for the endorsement of a 
specific vision of the good that is allegedly suppress d by liberal legalism. 
Either this vi ion should supplement liberalism, for a ne t gain of one "voice" 
in the law, or it should entirely replace liberalism, for a net gain of zero. 
Their call is not to maximize the number of visions of the good held in 
society or to celebrate "difference" in the abstract, but to claim recognition 
for their particular re lational vision. In other words, were it irrefutably 
shown to these theorists that their plans for reform would shrink the range 
of permissible visions of the good (by, for example, eliminating all those 
that have result d from the endorsem nt of liberalism in it current form ), 
they might well be indifferent. 
But if this is all that is meant by calls for the fuller acknowledgement of 
"difference" then there is no need to use the concept a t all. We should 
simply proceed to evaluate the substantive visions of the good advanced by 
ditlerence advocat s and decide which of them (if any) to adopt. 
III. DIFFERENCE AS INEQUALITY 
A second line of attack on liberal diversity denies even the possibili ty 
of individual autonomy as liberals conceive it. According to this argu-
ment, which grounds much critique of liberalism from postffiodern 43 
~ minists and critical-race th orists, liberal autonomy is a false construct 
that incorrectly assumes the presence and uncoerced choice-making 
power of a unified individual self that in fact does not exist.44 Advocates 
of this second \~ew attack liberalism by attempting to destabilize or "de-
construct" ideas such as autonomy and individual seUhood. Such schclars 
also attack the relational critics of liberalism for relying on falsely "essen-
43. The term 'postmodern" can mean many things, and I use it somewhat loosely in th is 
anicle. Angela Harris has described the usc of this term in jurisprudential literature: "[Post· 
modernism] suggest(sl that what has been presented in our social-political and our intelleclLIal 
traditions as knowledge, trlllh, objectivity, and reason are actually merely the eITe "ts of a 
particular form of social power, the victory of a particular way of representing the world tha t 
then presents itself as beyond mere in terpretation , as truth itself." Harris, supra note 2, at 748. 
44. See, e.g. , Hutchinson , supra note 11, at 11 84-85 ("Rather than thin k of the subject as a 
uni tary and sovereign subject whose sell<.] irec ted vocation is to bring the world to heel th rough 
the exacting discipline of rational inquiry, pos\JTIoderni5m interrogates the whole idea of 
autonomous subjec tivi ty and absu-ac t r<;asol1 ; it places them in a constan tly con tingent condi· 
tion of provisionali ty"); id. at 11 92 ("posl.modernists suggest that the tr-aditional notion of 
authenticity-' to thine own self be true '-is an immediate patienl for postmodern surgery"); 
Young, TIU' Ideal oj r'()l1wl'Iln il)l supra note 2, at 300,310 ("The idea ortlle self as a unified subjec t 
of desire and need and an origin of assertion and action has been powerfully 'ailed in to 
question by contemporary philosophers") ; id. a t 308-09 (criticizing liberal onception of 
moral autonomy). 
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tiali t" categories to describe, for xample, the differences b tween men 
and worn nY' They criticize relational theorists for associating the 
"male," or white majority, with lib ral autonomy and the "female," or 
racial minority, with nurturing and community, and then using this 
supposedly inh rent opposition to argue for the legal recognition of mar-
ginalized groups into law via communitarian reform of liberalism.46 An-
tiessentialist scholars charge that such efforts to define, for example, a 
"true female self' or a "true male self' deny the full range of human 
difference.47 
In th ir critiqu of both liberal div rsity and relational views, postrnodern 
difference theorists promote alternatives to liberal individualism that are 
grounded in the cel bration of difference itself.48 To remain internally 
consistent, su h theories must rely upon some nonessentialist under-
standing of persons for th charge that liberalism "d nies difference"49 and 
the attendant call for fuller recognition of this concept. 
A. Antiessential ist Difference 
How is the liberal vision of "diversity" distinct from the concept of "dif-
ference" employed by liberalism's antiessentialist critics? The latter incor-
45. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Gcruier T1'Olible, Fc'nini.st 77zeory, and Psyclwan(llytic Di5couTsc, in 
FlMINISM/ POSTMODERNISM 324, 338-39 (Linda J. Nichol on cd., 1990) ("Inasmuch a the 
construct of women presupposes a specificity and coherence that differentiates it from that of 
men, lhe categories of gender appear as an unproblematic point of deparl.ll,·e for feminist 
politics. But if . .. 'sex' itself is a category produced in the in te reSL~ of the hetero exual 
contract, or if we consider Foucaulr's suggestion l.hal . ex' desigr,ates an artificial unily thal 
works to maintain and amplifY the regulation ofsexuality\\~thin the reproductive domain , then 
it seems that gender coherence operates in much the same way, not as a ground of politics bul. 
as its effe n· 
46. See, e.g.,Joan Williams, Deconstn.cting Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989). For criticisms 
of feminist essentia lism, see gl'llerally Harris, ,,"pm notc 40; Elizabetl1 Spelman, INESSENTIAl. 
WOMAN (1988). Criticism of relational feminist essentialism comes not on ly from postmodern 
scholars but also from liberal and radical feminists. Se.e, e.g., J ean Ham pt.on, Feminist Contmetan:· 
anism, in AMI D OF 0 E'S OWN: Ff;MINI$T EsSA\S ON REAsON AND OBJECfMTY 227,231 (1993) 
(In the results of Gilligan's research showing that boys are more autonomous while girls are 
morc caring. "I hear the voice of a child who is preparing to be a member of a dominating 
group and the voice of another who is preparing to be a member of the group that i 
dominated"); MacKinnon , 5u/Jm note 40, at 38-39 (criticizing relational feminists for valuing 
as essentially feminine charactelistics, such as nurturing and care, that are the result of male 
domination). 
47. See, e.g., H.uri ,supra nOle 40, at -85 (arguing Ihal resull of "gender essentialism" is "not 
on ly thal some voices are silenc d in order to privilege olhers ... but t11 althc voices that are 
si lenc d turn OLIl to be th e same voices silenced by the mainstream legal voice of We the 
People-among them, Ihe voices of black women"). 
48. See, e.g., Minow, Mohillg All. the Difference, .HI.pm nOte 2, at 3-4 (raising \Vordes about the 
process of categorization thal resulis in the onclusion of difference). 
49. Young, Tlte Idnd o/Community, mpra note 2, at 307. 
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porates five fundamental themes. First, differences between people-as 
least insofar as they have social consequences-are results of social con-
struction, not biological or freely chosen phenomena.5o Se ond, the social 
assignment of the label "different" to some groups, and the elevation of 
that difference to political and/ or legal significance, is an exercise of 
power by majorities or elite over the persons or groups so labeled.51 
Difference is both the product of, and guarantor of, the continued sub-
ordination of powerless groups. A corollary is that the naming and norm-
ing process themselves help to create persons who exemplify the 
difference named.52 Third, it is impossible to transcend difference in favor 
of any objective "truth" about it, since each person is trapped within his 
50. See, e.g., Foster, Difference and EquaWy, supra nOle 2, at I I I ("To be useful in achieving the 
goal of equality, a diversity rationale should recognize those diITerences that have been 
constructed into a basis for, and have resulted in, systemic exclusion and disadvantage for 
individuals possessing tho~e differences"); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientati(}n and the Politic" af 
Biology: A Critique of the Argument From bmnutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503,505 (1994) ("The 
postmodern critique of liberal explanations of the self posits that culture , not human nature, 
gives humans their sexual OIientations"); Harris, supra note 2, at 762 (discussing the postmod-
ern "problem of the subject" and claiming that "( t)he language of race creates, maintains, and 
destroys subjects, both inside and outside the law"); id. at 784 ("Racial communities, like other 
human communities, are the products of invention, not discovery") ; Hutchinson, supra note 
11 , at 1192 ("The subject is a cultural creation, not a biological given"); Hutchinson, Inessen-
tially SPeaking (/.\' There Politics Ajler Posttllodernis'/1!~), 89 MICH. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (1991) (book 
review of Martha Min ow, Making AU the Difference) ("The postmodern temper has no eternal 
truth to offer and no immutable knowledge to dispense; it accepts the historically situated and 
socially constructed character of truths and knowledges"); id. at 1564 ("Differences are cultur-
ally imposed and socially policed"); Minow, Making All the Difference, supra note 2, at 19-23 
(discussing social construction of difference in context of the "diITerence dilemmas" it pro-
duces). 
51. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 45, at 326 (construction of the autonomous subject requires 
domination and oppression); Hutchinson, supra note 50, at 1563 ("Domination has been 
perpetuated and rationalized both by embracing difference (superiority of men over women 
and white-skinned people over black-skinned people) and by eschewing difference (o-eaunent 
of women as men and African Americans as white Europeans). These are the advantages that 
have made the establishment of power overwhelmingly white and male "); Minow, Making AU 
the Difference, supra note 2, at 50 (criticizing linkage in law between "difference" and "devi-
ance"); id. at 53 ("Assertions of a difference as 'the truth ' may indeed obscure the power of the 
person attributing the diITerence while excluding important competing perspectives. Differ-
en 'e is a clue to the social arrangements that make some people less accepted and less 
integrated while expressing the needs and interests of others who constitute the presumed 
model"). 
52. Harris, supr" note 2, at 762 ("The language of race creates, maintains, and destroys 
subjects, both inside and outside the law"); Hutchinson, supra note 50, at 1554 ("The process 
of labeling and naming is particularly fraught with dangers when it concerns people. To 
categorize is to choose, and, in so doing, there is no escaping the responsibility of judgment 
or its context of power") ; Minow, Makillg Ali the Difference, supra note 2, at 174-77 (identifying 
labeling theory as antecedent to her social relations approach, and explaining that "labeling 
theory studies the process by which an audience or communi ty identifies some people as 
deviants. That very pattern of identification has consequences for the labeled person which 
are difficult to escape. Those consequences include recurring patterns of exclusion and 
deviant behavior. Labeling theory thus treats difference as an idea developed by some people 
to describe others and to attribute meaning to others' behavior") . 
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or her own individual reality. 53 Fourth, the fact that difference is socially 
constructed rather than "natural" or intrinsic opens up the possibility of 
changing it and reforming society.54 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
we should worry about the hierarchical deployment of difference labels 
because only in doing so will we transcend liberal sameness-based equal-
ity55 and achieve real equality.56 
1. Martha Minow's "Difference Dilemmas" 
Professor Martha Minow's scholarship offers the richest discussion of this 
view of difference as applied to law, and for that reason it merits close 
scrutiny here.57 In her book, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, 
and American Law,58 Professor Minow criticizes American-style Jiberallegal-
ism for reinforcing socially created difference through its reliance on five 
false assumptions. 59 First, legal categories reinforce the invidious idea that 
'''differences' are intrinsic, rather than viewing them as expressions of 
comparisons bet\veen people on the basis of particular traits." This assump-
tion results in the assignment of the burden of difference to the person 
deemed "different" rather than to society at large. Thus, a deaf child in a 
53. Ser, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 50, at 1565 ("Although people are never nOl in a local 
context, they are never in a context that is not open to contingent revision"); id. at 1570 
("While persons are not reducible to their autobiographies, they never fully escape them; they 
forge their identities through the existential tension between confronting or confounding 
their autobiographies"); Hutchinson , supra note II , at 1187 ("Embedded in a constitute 
discourse of power, readers are also disciplined by the eXlarH protocols of power - they are 
subjects in transition"); Minow, Making ali lhe Difference, supra note 2, at 53 ("There is no single, 
superior perspective for judging questions of difference. No perspective asserted to produce 
·the truth' is without a situated per pective, because any statemem is made by a person who 
has a perspective"). 
54. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra nOle 11, at 1209 ("In the face of the problematized subject, 
postmodemism does not capitulate to or retreat from the task of struggling towards an 
enhanced social solidarity and experience of justice. The hope is to empower subjects by 
making them individually aware of their capacity for self (re)creation and collectively respon-
sible for establishing a mode of social life that multiplies Ule opportunities lor transformative 
action "); Minow. Making AlllllI! Differt'nce, SUP'I'(I note 2, at 53 ("DiITerence is a clue to the social 
arrangements that make some people less accepted and less integrated while expressing the 
needs and interests of others who constitute the presumed model. And social arrangemenL~ 
can be changed. An-angements thal assign the burden of "differences" to some people while 
making others comfortable are historical artifaCt •. Maintaining these historical patterns em-
bedded in the status quo is not neutral and cannot be justified by the claim that everyone has 
freely chosen to do so"). 
55. See, e.g., notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
56. See, e.g., note II and accompanying texl. 
57. See Hutchinson , 1II.pra note 50, at 1550-51 (reviewing Professor Minow's book Making All 
the Differtmce and noting that "In the jurisprudential corner of poslIllOdern scholarship, the 
work of Martha Minow deserves especial attention . Infused with a posunodern perspective, 
[Minow'sl writing stands at the frontiers of modern legal thinking in its efforts to reject and 
move beyond the modernist project of jurisprudence"). 
58. Supra note 2. Minow has also explained her view of difference, and her proposals to cure 
the "difference dilemma," in her other work. See generally Minow, When DIfference Has Its HOI/Ie, 
supra note 2; Min w, Fareword:Juslice £ngelldered, ""pm note 2. 
59. Minow, Making Ailihe Difference, supra note 2, at 50-74. 
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classroom of hearing children is deemed "differ nt" from the others and 
treated separately by law as a result of that differen e.6(J 
Second, this legal proces of difference labeling illegitimately a sume 
certain "norms" from th standpoint of which it deems some persons 
"different": ''The hearing-impaired student is differ nt in omparison to the 
norm of the hearing stud l1l-yet the hearing student differs from the 
hearing-impaired tudent as much as she differs from him . .. . "6 1 For 
Minow, this "norming" proce s is problematic becau 'e "[u]nstated points of 
r ference may express the xperi nee of a majority or may e, pI' ss the 
perspective of those who have had gr ater access to the power used in 
naming and assessing others." The relatively powerless may suffer under 
judgments of inferiority that result from this biased process of naming and 
norming.62 Minow offers many legally reI vant examples of this ritique of 
legal categories, including the exclusionary labeling as "different" of dis-
abled persons, of stud nts whose first language is not Engli h , of racial 
minorities, of gays and lesbians, of women, and of religious minoriti S.63 In 
each case, Minow aver, some norm-of "abl ness," or English speaking, or 
whiteness, or mal nes ', or heterosexuality- has been used to justify treating 
as different and inferior those who fail to omply with the norm.u4 
Third, the law falsdy assumes that those who perform these naming and 
norming actions are themselves neutral, without a per peCliv .65 Differ-
ences are assumed to be objective, observable, and capable of legal catego-
rization, reflecting the law's "aspiration to impartiali ty," an "aspiration 
[that] risks obscuring the inevitable perspec tive of any given legal offi-
cial ... and thereby makes it harder to challenge the impact of perspective 
on the selection of u"aits used to judge legal consequences." The op ration 
of the myth of impartiality, Minow contends, is illustrated by the defendant 
in an employment case who urged Judge Constance Baker Motley to dis-
qualify herself from the case "because she, as a black woman who had once 
60. Id. at 81-83 (discussing case of Rowley v. Board of Eouc" 483 F. upp. 528 (S.D .. Y. 
1980) , aJf'd F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980); rev'd 458 U.s. 176 (1982), involving dispute benveen 
Rowleys and Board of EducaLion over whether federal law emi tled the Rowleys' hearing-im-
paired child, Amy, to a sign-language interpreter in all her cia ses, or whether the school's 
educational plan , which supplemented Amy"> experience in "mainstream" classroom with 
special tutoring, saLisfied the law). Minow nOtes, id. at 82, that "[b)oth sid s [in the case) 
assumed that the problem was Amy'S: because she was difIerem fi'oll1 other stlldents, the 
solution must focus on her. Both sides deployed the unstated nOrm of the hearing studelll who 
receives educational input [rom a [cacheI', rather than imagini ng a different. norm around 
which the enLire classroom might be constrIlCled." 
61. [d. at51. 
62. M See aiso, Young,justia< and the Politics of Difference, supra note 2, at 169 (,The attempt 
to reduce all persons to the un ity of a common measure constrllcts as oeviant those whose 
alu'ibmes differ from the group-specific alu;butes implicitly presumed in the norm. The drive 
to unify the particularity and multiplicity of practices ... turns difference into xclu ion "). 
63. Minow, Makillg AU the Difference, Sf/11ra note 2, at 31-47. 
64. !d. at 51 - 52 (describing how U.S. constitutional equa li ty norms '"[make) the recognition 
of differences a basis for denying equal treatmem·'). 
65. Id. 
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repre ented plaintiffs in dis rimination cases, would identify with tho e who 
suffer ra or e discrimination. Th defendant a sumed that Judge Mot-
ley's per onaJ identity and h r past politicaJ work had made her different, 
lacking th [normal judicial] abili ty to perceive without a perspectiv ."66 
Declining to reuse herself, Judge Motley pointed out that "[i]fbackground 
or sex or rac of each judge were, by definition, sufficient grounds for 
removal, no judge on this court could hear this cas [since] ... all of them 
were attorney , of a S x, often with di tingul hed law firm or public ervice 
backgrounds. "67 
Fourth, the per pective of tho being labeled "differ nt" is either ig-
nor d outright or assumed to have b el accounted for by thos who create 
and maintain th particular norm in question. 58 Thus, 
many legal observers have viewed aflirmative action as nonneutral, compared 
with status quo u'eatments of race and gender in employment and other 
disu'ibutions of societal resources. Proposals to alter rules about gender roles 
encounter objections, from both men and women, to what is seen as undesir-
able disruption in the expectations and predictability of social relationships. 
uggestions to in tegrate schools, private clubs, and other social institu-
tions . .. provoke protests that these changes would interfere with freedom-
referring, often expli itly, to the freedom of those who do not wish to 
associate with certain oth rs .69 
Fifth, these legal and social practices reinforce the false assumption that 
our xisting institutional arrang ments are natural, neutral, and therefore 
inevitable.7o 
Minowargue that the root problem with this way of handling difference 
is that it creates and perpetuates inequality: ''Buried in the questions about 
difference are assumptions that difference is linked to stigma or deviance 
and that sameness is a prerequisite for equal ity."7 I On her view "[d]iffer-
nce is relational, not intrinsic,"72 because "[wJho or what hould be taken 
as the pain t of reference for d fining differences is debatabl ." From the 
viewpoint of the m~jority a person in a wheelchair is "handicapped"; from 
that person's perspective the majority may be termed 'Temporarily ble 
Persons." Whose point of view should serve as the anchor of law is a 
question that must be discussed rather than buried.73 related assumption 
66. hi. a t 60-61. 
67. /d. a t 61. 
68. {d. 
69. !d. a t 71 . 
70. Id. 
71. Id. a t 50. SP.P also Mino\\', Group Homes for the MentaUy Relarded, supra note 2, at 113 
("Categorical approachc "-attributing difference to different people- undermine commit-
mentS to equality). 
72. /d. 
73. Id. at 51. 
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is that "[t]here is no single, superior perspective for judging questions of 
difference. No persp ctive asserted to produc ' the truth' is without a 
situated perspective, because any statement is made by a person who has a 
perspective. "71 Assignments of difference are social decisions that reflect, 
and therefore offer a chance to explore, the structure of power and hierar-
chy in society, to reveal its plasticity, and thereby to empower ourselves to 
change it. 75 
Minow claims lhat the assumptions about difference that underly our 
law result in apparently unsolvable "difference dilemmas, " presenting 
equality advocates with a choice between acknowledging certain differ-
ences, such as handicaps, race, or gender, via "special treatment" programs 
that may simultaneously reinforce th stigma attached to the difference, 
or ignoring the difference altogether, which can itself make the difl'erence 
continue to matter given underlying social inequality.76 Thus, with respect 
to race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs, the "dilemma 
of difference" involves questions of how to avoid the stigma traditionally 
attached to race and gender while trying legally to remedy the wrongs 
done by labeling women and minorities as both different and inferior. 
As Minow phrases it: "How can historical discrimination on the basis of 
race and gender be overcome if the remedies themselves use the forbid-
den categories of race and gender? Yet without such remedies, how can 
historical discrimination and its legacies of segregation and exclusion be 
transcended?"77 
It follows that solving the difference problem is not simply a matter of 
either ignoring difference or openly accommodating it, as both methodolo-
gies result in serious problems for groups that have been disadvantaged by 
treatmen t as "differ n t. "78 
Minow urges the questioning and rejecting of norms that justify inferior 
treatment for groups such as the disabled, foreign-language speakers, racial 
minorities, and women.79 And she suggests methods of furthering her 
underlying equality ideal by incorporating difference into the social struc-
tur in ways that purge them of hierarchy.80 For example, she recommends 
dealing ,vith communication problems bel:\ .... een a hearing-impaired child 
and her hearing classmates by teaching all the chi ldren sign language. Such 
an approach, Minow claims, "would treat the problem of difference as 
74. Id. at 53. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 20, 25, 27, 36. 
77./d. 
78. See generally ill. 
79. See, e.g., Minow, WlIt'1l Difference Has It" Ho"'~, supra note 2, at 128 ("Categories and 
attributions of difference can perpetuate or increase disparities of power between different 
groups. Attributions of difference should be sustained only if Lhey do noL express or confirm 
the distribution of power in ways that harm the less powerful and benefi lthe more powerful"). 
80. Minow, Making AU/he Difference. supra note 2, at 81-84. 
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embedded among all the students, making aU of them part of the problem," 
rather than "assum[ing] that the problem of difference is located in th 
hearing-impaired child. ~ 
2. Rights and Exclusion 
Recall the question that prompted this discussion of Professor Minow's view 
of difference; How does that view differ (if at all) from a liberal view of the 
relation hip betw n difference and equality? The answer requires an 
evaluation of both Minow's critique of liberal-rights analysis and of her 
affirmative proposals to replace it 
a. Minow's critique of liberalism. Although Professor Minow acknow-
ledges that liberal rights-based approaches to law can remedy discrimina-
tion against some persons, she claims that in the end liberal visions of 
equality, grounded in the sameness of rationality or autonomy, improp-
erly exclude those who do not possess the requisite degree of these quali-
ties8l : 
De pite its liberatory rhetoric of inclusion and fundamental entitlement, the 
analysis of rights. developed in constitutional and statutory judicial doctrines 
in this country, runs aground on the shoals of the two-track system of legal 
treatment. On track offers basic rights to self-dete rmination and participa-
tion for tho e who satisfy the criteria of rational thought and independence; 
the other offers special treaLment and, quite often, social and political exclu-
sion. Those treated as "different ft who can demonstrate that they correctly 
belong on th first track may find considerable help through the rhetoric of 
rights. hose who fail to satisfy th test of "sameness," however, may find 
rights analysis a bitter remedy that undermines whatever pas t acknow-
ledgment of difference there had been without producing social and political 
inclusion.82 
Minow argues that liberal "sameness" assumptions endanger the few spe-
cial benefits accorded to the historically "different"; 'Thus, efforts to elimi-
nate gender bias in divorce law have removed alimony and child-custody 
provisions that pre~ rred women, and some observers attribute to these 
reforms the increased impoverishment and worsened bargaining position 
of women following divorce. "83 In short, rights-based approaches to law 
end up reinforcing inequality not only by embracing the legal processes 
of differ nce-creation embodied in the five core assumptions outlin d 
81. See, e.g. , Minow, id., supra note 2, at 147 ("Righ ts analysis offers release from hierarchy 
and subordination to those who can match the picture of the abstract, autonomOIJS individual 
presupposed by the theory of rights. For those who do not match that picture, application of 
rights analysis can be not on ly unresponsive bUl also punitive"). 
82. fd. at 146. 
83. Id. at 146-47. 
84. See supra, text accompanying notes 59-70. 
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above,84 but also by hiding the continuation of social, political, and legal 
hierarchy behind the (false) app arance of equal opporlun ity.85 
At its core, this critique attacks the liberal assumption that autonomy is a 
species-wide trait among humans,86 charging that this assumption illegiti-
mately xcludes some persons.87 Thus, Minow's fundamental complaint i 
against liberal equality as justification: She argues thal grounding legal rights 
in the descriptive samenesses of agency, rationality, or autonomy is wrong 
because it is exclusionary.88 
85, See, e,g, , t.Iinow, Making AU the Differnue, supra note 2, at 152 ("Pretense of universal , 
inclusive norms in the public sphere obscures the power of assigned d ifferences in the pli,'ate 
sphere "); ,iii. at 223 ('The relational challenge suggests that [the limits SCI. on responsibi liLies 
by rights analysis] reflect a particular perspective not because it is correct but beG1USe it 
expresses the worldview of those who have had sufficient power to shape prevailing social 
institmions") ; id, at 217 (feminist work has con tributed to the relational project by "recasting 
issues of 'di fference' as problems of dominatjon or subordinaLion in order to disclose the social 
relationships of power within which difierence is named and enforced"); id. at 224 ( ocial 
relations approach sees "[d ]ifferences that yield social d istance and exclusion. , , as the self-
sening expressions of th e more powerful") ; id, at 239 ("Those who \'~n a given struggle for 
control may have be tter access to the means of producing knowl edge, such as mass media and 
schools. Such control Illay even shape the terIllS of access so that exclusions of other points of 
liew appear neutral, based on merit or on other standards endorsed even by those who remain 
excluded") , 
86, F..g" id. at 1.55 (criLicizing as inelitably situated the liberal reliance on noLion of "amona-
mous, able-bodied " person); id. at 150 ("the heuri tic delice of the social COI1lract presumes to 
address only autonomous, independent individuals") ; id,at2 16 (charging tIl ,1l rights analysis 
applies only LO tho e who are, or can analogize themselves to , independent persons); id, at 147 
("Righ ts analysis ofiers release from hierarchy and subordination to those who can match tile 
picture of the abstract, autonomous indilidual presupposed by the theory of rights. 'or tIlOse 
who do not match that picture, application of lights analysis can be not on I)' unresponsive but 
also punitive"). 
87. See, e.g., id, at 152 ("Despite the impl ied aspiraLion to universal inclusion, the social 
ContraCl approach has been deeply exclusionary"); id. at 153 (- rhe presentation ofa type of 
human being as though it described all human beings risks excluding any who do not fit or 
treating such misfits as deliant."); ill, at 154 ("Rawls's differcnce p rincip le prc erves too much 
of the concept of til e ab tract individual-a concept that claims but fai ls to secure universal-
ity-to respond fully to issues of difference"); id. at 155-56 (''The natural rights u'adition also 
partakes of the assumpLions of the au tonomous and abstract ind ividual and excludes or 
subordinates any who fai l to meet these assumptions"); id, at 156 ('~rhe premise of a basic 
human nature, found in the abstract individual capable of reason, undergirds [natural law] 
theory and risks excluding any who do not mee t. it. Theories of natu ral law locate the 
jusLification for universal rights in human reason or cogniLion, This focus on reason makes 
problernaLic any persons who do not manifest to the sa tisfacLion of tIlOse in charge til e requisite 
capacities for raLional thought," and nflering children and the mCI1laJl y disabled as examples 
of such excluded persons). 
88. E.g., id. at 146 ("The 'sameness' between people emphasiled by righL~ analysis chal-
lenges special accommodations made for disabled pt:ople, women, and others h istorically 
treated as d ifferent"); id, at 152 ("All per,ons are equal because of this Fundamental same-
ness-yet th is sameness seems lO be the emptiness left when we are each sheared of all that 
makes uS dillerent"); id, at 223 ("Equating sameness with equality, righ ts analysis oilers a k.ind 
of certainty and a set of limits: equal treatment, yes, but limited to a eompatison with the other 
group"); see also Young,jllsliceand lite Politics oiDifference, supra note 2, at17 1 ("In general , then, 
a relaLionaI understa,nding 01 group difference rejects exclusion "). 
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This ~argument fro m exclus ion~ cannot survive analysis, for at least tv.·o 
reasons. First, the argument rests upon a dramatically impoverished con-
ception of liberalism. Professor Millow writes tha t, despite its ~ad mirable 
comm itme nt to universali ty and inclusion," 
the [liberal] social comr.J.ct approach has been deeplyexdusionary. It is not 
only that any sign of difference, any shred of situated perspective, threatens 
Ule claim to similarity, equality, and identity as an absu'act individual-al-
though these problems are serious enough; it is that this conception amounts 
to a preference for some points of view oller others; it takes some types of 
people as the norm and assigns a position of difference to others (thus 
adopting the assumption s behind the difference dilcmma).89 
Although it is true tha t some forms of liberalism re ly on the existence of 
certain th resho ld levels of rationality and/ or autonomy in humans, it is 
e mphatically not true that ~any sign of diffe rence .. , th reatens the clai m to 
simila ri ty, equali ty, ~ etc., on the liberal view. As the discussion above pointed 
out, liberalism accommodates a substantial array of difference and that 
accommodation is exp/iail)' grounded in the liberal's prior respect fm- fimdamental 
samene5s.90 
Second, Minow's de piction of liberal autonomy is fatally shallow. AI 
various poi n ts she describes autonomy as syno nymous with be ing able-
bodied and wi th physical inde pendence from others, suggesting that the 
liberal's ~autonomous~ person must possess not on ly the capacity fo r ra-
tional deliberation and cho ice ma king but also the abili ty physically to carry 
out those cho ices.91 But this vicw relies on far tOO thin a conception of 
autonomous action. c..n Christopher Reeve, now a quadriplegic, be said to 
89. /d. at 152. 
90. Supra text accompan}1ng notes 14-33. 
91. !in. t.g., Minow, Making All 1M DifftrtllU, supra note 2, at 155 (criticizing rights theory for 
its "a$SUlllption of an autonomous, able-txxlied perso:m "); id. at 150-51 ("The heurislic deo.ice 
of the social contract presumes to address only autonomous, independent individu;ds who can 
separate themselves from others and enter freel~', unencumbered, into an agreement aboout 
how (0 conduct pri\"ale and public affairs. .. A very different design for ... conceiving of the 
foundations of a society would be llecessary in order to include directly those who "1thin 
contemporary society seem disabled and those historically treated as incompetent and incapa· 
ble of participating in Ihe formation of a rational consensus"). 
Other theorists have posited concepts of autonomy that add to rational choice-making 
power the existence of a sufficient range of options and of the ability to act on one's choices. 
!in, t.g., Fallon. rupra note 13, at 886 (offering modified Razian \1sion of autonomy and 
claiming that "descriptive autonomy depends on at least four elements lhat constitute the 
-conditions of autonoITlY-' (I) cri lical and sclf-critical ability; (2) competence to aCI; (3) 
sufficient options; and (4) independence of coercion and manipulation~). Fallon claims that 
under this conception of autonomy, ")a) physically helpless person, such as a quadriptegic, is 
not autonomous in important respects." Id. at 888. Once aw.tin, this v;"-w is \lltnerable \0 the 
charge leveled against Minow-that il rests upon rar 100 sparse a conception of what it means 
to "acI.-
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lack a req uisite level of aUlonomy because he cannot physically do things 
most oth ers can? Is Reeve, with the mo ney to h ire others to compensate for 
h is disability, dearly less autonomous l ilall , say, a com pletely impoverished 
but able-bodied person, or a severely retarded but able-bodied person? or 
course nOL In fact, liberals have argued for special accommodations-such 
as wheelchair access-for the physically disabled, in rerognition of their posses-
riM oJ the threshold level oJ autMomy that j ustifi es equal rights and responsi-
bilities. O n any reasona ble theory of what it means to "act," individua ls do 
not have to be able-bodied or physically independent to be autonomous in 
the liberal sense; they must simply possess the moral and inte llectual abili ty 
to make certai n types of choices about their lives and lO make meaningful 
attem pts, physically or otherwise, lO realize those choices. 
Professor Minow is q uite critical of this idea that autonomy is fundamen-
tally a men tal capacity. For example, she a llacks the scholarship of philo so-
pher David Lam b for "defining human life in terms of capaci ty for 
thought," since Lamb's definition "would exclude persons in a persistent 
vegetative state. "92 Suppose this is correct-that liberal justifica tions of 
equali ty that are grounded in descriptive assum ptions of human rationali ty 
and autonomy do, in fact, "exclude~ those in a persistent \'egetative state 
and perhaps some affiicted by severe mental disabilities.9.'1 In this context 
"exdusion ~ presumably refers to the lack of any equality-based justrfication 
fo r u'eating such individuals as equals in a liberal society. T hose who lack 
the requisite level of autonomy or rationali ty have no claim to be treated as 
equals in a regime whose justification of legal eg-dlitarianism is defined by 
those qualities. 
At one level this scenario simply highligh ts the limits of equali ty itself as 
a legal principle. Arguably, the idea of equali ty-however justified and 
however defined-does not work a t all in the context of arguing for better 
treatment of those whose disabilities have made them permanently in capa-
ble not only of autonomous cho ice making but also of forming relation-
ships, of caring for themselves physically, o r (as in the case of comalOse 
people) of even kn owing who, or that, they are. We might say, for example, 
that the person in a persistent vegetative state has the "right" not to be killed 
for spon. But is this "'right" an equality-based right? Surely not; the "'right" is 
grounded not in the equality of the comatose person to the rest of humanity, 
bm in other reasons-in o ur hope t11at such individuals will someday "wake 
up," perhaps; or in our compassio n for them and their fam ilies; or in our 
92. Minow, MiU:ing AU 1M DifftmlU, supra note 2, at 152. 
93. At times Minow lreaLS children a lld the memally disabled :u groups excluded by 
liberalism. But th is is dramatically overreaching. As Minow herself concedes, liberal throry 
acknowledges the personhood of children as JUrure autonomous agents. /d. at ]56. And, unless 
one defines "mental disabili ty· in such a way that il refers to extremely severe psychological or 
cognitive deficits. it is far too simplistic to assume that all mentally disabled pcr$Ons lack 
rationality or the capacity to make autonomous choices about their lives. 
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conviction that a llowi ng such killing would lead us to become callous 
toward greater a trocities.94 
For the purposes of this essay, however, an even more important conclu-
sion follows from Minow's charge that liberal sameness assumptions are 
unjustly exclusionary. Notice that her argumem implies that "true eq uality~ 
necessitates treating such people as equals, But that statement itself requires 
justification. Upon what theory of equality is it based? Two possibi li ties ex ist. 
First, she could be argu ing not that sameness-based equal ity is per st' unjust, 
but that autonomy and rationali ty are simply the wrong samenesses upon 
which to ground assumptions of equal moral worth and legal equali ty. On 
this theory lhe use of autonomy as equality's core justification is illegiti-
mately exclusionary because ( I ) what makes persons equal is really some-
th ing else-relational ability or em pathy, for example-and (2) this truth 
has been unjustly quashed by the autonomy prin ci ple. AI least one advocale 
for Ihe mentally d isabled, for example, has argued th at assumptions of 
equali ty based on the capacity for love, empathy, and ~communality" ought 
to replace autonomy-based legal structures that single out the melllally 
disabled as different and inferior.95 
But such proposals arc not available either to Minow or to other postm od-
ern critics of liberalism, who consistently attack such ideas as "essentialist. ~ 
On the posunodern view, any assumption of sameness among humans is 
suspect because it so often leads us to ignore or suppress radical difference. 
For this reason Martha Minow consistently condem ns sameness-based 
equality per st', a position that logically com pels her to rejcct proposals that 
would simply substitute o ne for m of sameness for anOlher.96 Autonomy, 
connectedness, empathic ability--even species membership-are a ll same-
nesses that she necessarily rejects as bases for legal equality. So Minow must 
be argu ing that, despite the fact that no sameness can properly ground 
equali ty, all persons should nevertheless be treated as eq uals. But the crucial 
point is this: Minow's critique of sameness-based equality kaves her un'th no 
ansu..oer to the question o/why "We should treat all persons, including permanently 
comatost' persons, as equals.97 If people are radically and irreducibly different, 
94. Or perhaps the "right" is ground.,.:! in a I'ery basic principle of "s.lmeness"-that of 
species membership. But such a principle can only sefve as a very weak justification fOf legal 
rights. For why ought species membership to justify slIch rights? The f<:adiesl fesponse is 
phrased in terms of SOIM othrrquality that constitutes the real justification for the right_that 
the human species shares the capacity for rationality, autonomy. empathy, moral pef~nality, 
and so on. This takes the argument back to square one. 
95. Robert L. Hayman,Jr. , Prtsumptians ofjl>sliC'; I.mv, "olilir:s. fInd the fIImtally Rr/tlrriLd I'atml. 
lOS ~RV. L. REv. 120\ ( 1990) (criticizing autonomy- and rationality-hased presumptions 
employed in judicial decisions about parenting abilities of mentally handicapped persons. and 
arguing \113t relational abilities of such persons should form the basis for a new legal standard 
of evaluation of parenting abilities). 
96. Nevertheless. she ultimately tries to go this route, and I evaluate her attempt in tile next 
section. infra, text accompanying notes 99-116. 
97. And a non-sameness--based justification of e<;juality seems entirely unanractive, for rea-
sons I .... ,11 discuss in the ne)[1 section. 5« infra, text accompanying note 150. 
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what justi fi es legal equaliry? Mi llow ad\'ocatcs "real eq ual ity" through the 
proper recogn ition of differe nce; but such hopes are em pty rhc LOric in the 
absence ofsQmc underlyingjustific<lt ion for the declared equality principle. 
As I argue below,98 eq ualiry cannot be fully j ustified witho ut affirm ing 
sameness of some kind- the rejection of sameness, therefore. necessarily 
im plies the rejection of any rich theory of legal equality. 
h. M inow's "social relo.tions" approach: back 10 esse1rlialism. Th e discussion 
thus fa r has revealed core weaknesses in Minow's atLack on li bera l sameness-
based eq uality. As a liule renection makes clear, her proposed rqJw.a:mentfor 
liberal legal structures is even more nawed. In place of conventional civi l-
rights methodology. which focllses on erasing miscategorizalions of persons 
as inferior in behalf of an underlri ng be lief in the rational, autonomous sd f-
hood of all human be ings,99 Professor Minow advances a suspicion of catego-
rization perse. Minow atlem pts to move the inquiry from one involving ~true~ 
and ~false ~ categories to one in\'olving th e dangers of categorization itself: 
[T] he social relations approach assumes that there is a b.1sic connectedness 
between people, instead of assuming that autonomy is the prior and essential 
dimen sion of personhood. The social relation s approach is dubious of 
the method o f social organization that constructs human rel~lIionships in 
te r ms of immutable categories. fixed statuses and inherited or ascribed 
traiL~.1()O 
Min ow acknowledges that categorization is necessary, but she warns that it 
ought to be profoundly m istrusted owing to il~ histo ry of usc for the 
purpose of creati ng power inequities. 
Via her ~social re lations~ approach to difference, Mi now seeks both to 
acknowledge social categories and to re nder them powerless. Her proposal 
contains several key e lements. First, it de picts difference as hie rarchical and 
urges that prevailing social norms be exposed as simply th e poi n l~ of view 
of the powerful and thereby robbed of thei r natural, intrinsic, and stable 
auras. WI For Minow the key question to consider in evaluat ing the legal 
response to an alleged difference is whether and how it affects human 
relationships: 
The [social relations] strategy. . considers the relationship between the 
namer an d th e named that is manilested in categories and labels and that is 
98. "ifra. text accompanying note 151. 
99. Sn discussion wpm. lext accompanying notes 32-33 (liberal civil-lighl' mcthods 
grounded in belicf that rniJCategorizalions must be supplanted by correct categorizations). 
100. Minow. When Di//"",ct' Has 1150 HoNU'. ~"pm nOle 2. al 127-2R. 
101. Sn. t ,g., Minow. M"ki~g All 1M Dijf«rmct'. supra nOle 2. at 80 ("· Difference can be 
understood not as intrinsic but as a function of relationships. as a comparison dr.lwn between 
;1Il indi\idual and a norm that can be stated and c\",llIat«l"); Minow. \\'hfn Di/Jl'TI'nrt Has 1150 
HQIM. wpr" nOle 2, al 113 ("An egalitarian id"al would 1.><: better served by an approach Ihat 
emphasizes the relationships between people"). 
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lived in daily experiences. Docs the act of naming cut off or deny relation-
ships? Affirmative answers 10 questions of th is son would support a conclu-
sion that the attribution of diflcrence violates the foundational premise of 
ongoing relationships. Such a violation should trigger protection for the 
constitutionally protected values of equality and freedo m of associalion. 102 
89 
This foclls 011 the primary imponan ce of relationships as the basis for legal 
equality immediately raises two questions. First, if it is "ongoing relation-
ships~ that oughllo trigger the enforcement of constilUtional protections, 
what happens to individuals-such as those in a "persistent vegelative state H 
and those with severe menlal disabi lities-who are incapable of form ing 
relationshi ps wit h others? Isn 't Minow simply advocating a new for m of 
essentialist sameness-the capacity to have relationships-and argu ing, in 
direct contradiction to her simuhaneous njection of sameness-based rights 
per Sf, that this ncw sameness should replace autonomy and rationali ty as 
thc proper j ustifi cation of equal ity? Ifso, Minow's social relations approach 
raises the vcry same problem of exclusion that prompted her attacks on 
liberal ism. 
Second, the social relations approach relies heavily on the fac ul ty of 
empath), as a way of produci ng discussions about difference bet ..... een the 
powerful and the dominated. Professor Minow writes that the social rela-
tions theofY is rooted in "learning to take the perspective ofanother,H and 
she presents it as "an openi ng wedge for an alterna tive to traditional legal 
treaunents of difference."103 By ta lking and listening to others who are 
different, those in power will come to realize that ~di ffefe nce~ is rela tional 
and debatable-lhat the hearing children in a classroom are as different 
from thei r deaf classmate as she is from them-and that issues of difference 
thus necessari l)' place both the ~normal " and the '"different" person in 
relationship to each other. Th us, Minow makes empathy, particularly judi-
cial em pathy, in to the chief means of moving society from the status quo, 
which she depicts as illegitimately individualist and eli lis t, toward a greater 
focus upon the im portance of connectedness and relationshi ps.IO-I She 
hopes that such em pathic perspective-laking wi ll help reconceive rights, 
102. Minow, llkon I)jJJt:m,,:~ HaIlt. Homt', supra note 2. at 130. 
103. Minow. Milking AI/lilt DiffI':rfflU, supra note 2. at 379. 
104. SN. {.g., id. at 384-87, 389 (discussing importance of such perspective taking): Minow, 
llkon DiJJfmlu HIlS Its H~. supra nOte 2. al t2Y (discussing need for judges \.0 adopt the 
IJerspective of (\lOse latx:1t:d "differenT-). Alone poim in her book Minow denies that her 
approach embraces empathy; _ id. at 219. But she seems only to intend by that statement to 
sep.lfate herself from relation:d feminist cla ims that empathy is a namra!, organic, and/or 
unre/le(t;l'cly easy process. at least for women. /d. at 219-20 {making ulis poim in COlllext of 
a short story. -AJury of Her l'ee rs-j. [n fact. Minow's advocacy ofperspectil'e laking constitutes 
the tkfil1itioll of e"'pathy: _. ,.g., Robert M. Goldenson. 1 THE ENCYCI.OPEDIA OF I'!UMAN 
BEHAI'IO R: 1's\UlOI.OGY. PS\I:::I!IATRY. A/lID MI'.NT.-I.L Ht:AI:fH 395 {1970} {defining empathy as "the 
capacity to Undef5tilnd ilnd in some meilsure shilre ilnother person's state of mind-}. Whether 
emp.lIhy comes namrally or is an acquired (haracteristi(, and whether o r not women POSSCilS 
it more than men, arc questions external to the definition of the (oncep1. 
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preserving the ir liberating potential while grounding them not in rational-
ity o r autonomy but in con ncCledness and the recognition of untranscend-
able perspective. lOr. 
Th e usc of em pathy, or ~perspecti\'e t3king," as a means of improving 
liberal ism is hardly new. Communilarians and relational feminists see p0-
litical empathy as central to the effective replacement of liberal legalism 
with more communal, mutually interdependent, and altruistic legal SlrUC-
lures. 106 To the extent these proposals express the view tha t we should all 
be nicer and more understanding of each other, they clearly have merit. But 
the atlempt to deploy empathy as a new basis for legal decision making will 
fail-and rightly so. 
Empathy can be understood in two ways-as the imagined projection of 
one's ~selJ into the person of another, or as an auempt to understand the 
other as essen tially different, without trying to fuse o ne's identity with the 
other's or to assume a basic sameness of ~selr between empathizer and the 
other, The first understanding, which I have called ~projective empathy,"107 
is not merely consistent with liberalism; it is the foundation of liberal 
progress toward the realization of equal rights for aJI.l08 Projective em pathy 
relies, in essential part, on the realization th at despite our differences, I and 
the object of my empathic atlention are the same and therefore eq ual. This 
view of em pathy may, in fact, have motivated the Supreme Court decision 
in Brown v. Board of Educalion,l09 the most famous American civil-rights 
case. 110 It is a view of perspective-taking that would be unacceptable to 
Professor Minow, who repeatedly rejects the liberal notion that equali ty 
ought to be based on sameness. lll She must rely, therefore, on a second 
105. l\.linow, Maki~g Ali I~ Diffmma, supra note 2. at 382-83 (defending her concept of 
-rights in relationship- as an important IOQI for challenging hierarchical effeclil of socially 
created difference). 
106. For examples of elllp<lthy's promotion as a tool of political and legal reform, 5«, ~.g., 
Nancy L. Rosenblum, ANonn;R IJIlERAUSJ,I: ROMANTICISM AND THE RECONSlll.UCTION OF UBERAL 
THOUGHT 184 (1987) (linking communitarianisITl with a -politics of ... empathy"); (;ass Sun-
stein. &y<m.d Ik Rtpublirm, Ikviual, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1555 (1988) (explaining the concept of 
political empathy and itsconnection to cOlllmunitarian visions of law); Robin West, u.w, Rights, 
aM DIM 'l"olnnlr.IIlUJiaru: 1.Lglll Ubtralilm atul FrrodJ 1'h«Jry of 1M Rult of lAW, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 
S17,859 (1986) (associating promotion of empatJlic law with relational feminists and commu-
nitarians); _ gmer-ally Dailey, supra note 2. I have been skeptical about empathy's fKltential as 
a tool for promoting legal communitarianisrn. Stt-Cynthia V. Ward, A Kiruln; Grolltr Libmllis"..· 
Visions of t;mjJalhy in Fmlinisl "M Commutlilarian UlnaluTe, 61 U. Clil. L. Rev. 929 (1994). The 
discussion in this section applies the conceptions of empathy introduced in tJlat article. 
107. Ward, supra note 106, at 936. 
108. /d. at 'J!H--45 (developing a concept of projective empathy as an inherent premise of 
liberalism). 
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
110. For discussions of emp<lthy's possible role in the Brown decision, _, t.g .• Lynne N. 
Henderson. 14f'llity ami Empathy, 85 MtCH. L. REv. 1574 ( 1987); Ward, supra nOle 106, at 
941--42. 
III. &t, t .g., Minow, Mak;"g AU 1M DifftmlO', supra note 2, at SO, 74-75 (citing defeclil of 
equality principle hased on sameness). 
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vision of em pathy, which I have called "imaginati\'e empathy. ~112 This un-
derstanding of empathr acknowledges radical diversi ty-that empathizer 
and other are ineradicably different and separa te-but nevertheless as-
sumes that it is possible at least partially to understand the other despite his 
or her difference. Imaginative empathy therefore recognizes diversity and 
may escape reliance on sameness-but, I have argued, loses any in nate 
connection with equali ty.1l3 While projective empathy sus through differ-
ence to find equality, imaginative empatlly stops at the point of acknow-
ledging and appreciating difference, thereby losing any innate connection 
to equality.114 The point should be clear: Liberalism incorporates an equal-
ity-friendly understanding of empathy that is rooted in sameness, whereas 
nonliberal empathy stands in direct tension with equali ty. Professor Mi-
now's social relations approach must fa il because its core premise. that 
empathic "perspective taking" can simultaneously transcend sameness and 
embrace equality, is false. 
c. The emptiness of the postmodern vision of difference. I n sum, neither Mi-
now's critical a ttacks on liberalism nor her affirmative proposals to replace 
it can survive careful analysis. Her critique of liberal rights theories reduces 
to one claim: That such theories improperly rely on the concept of au ton-
omy to justify equal and individual rights. Minow argues that this reliance 
is wrong because it excludes some persons from being treated as equals, 
resulting in the label ing of such individuals as "different" and inferior. But 
her narrow depiction of the foundations of liberal though t, coupled with 
her failure to otTer an equali ty-based justification for her universal inclusion 
principle, leaves this critique com pletely undefended. 
Minow's affirmative argument for the "social relations approach~ not 
only raises the spectre of essentialism-which she elsewhere fi rmly and 
repeatedly repudiatesllL-but also relies heavily on a difference-based con-
cept of empathy that is actually antieq uality. Two premises form the core of 
the social relations approach: First, sameness-based theories of equality are 
wrong because they label some persons as different and inferior; second, 
our shared human capacity for empathic dialogue can lead us to real 
equality. But to the extent it is rooted in the rejection of sameness, Minow's 
theory fights with equali ty; and insofar as she introduces a new sameness, 
the sameness of empathic ability, as the proper basis for rights and legal 
categories, Minow-like comm unitarians and relational feminists-simply 
deploys the notion of difference as a stalking horse for her own particular 
brand of sameness-based equality.116 
112. Ward. supra nOIe: 106. a1948. 
liS. (d. al 949. 
114. Id. 
115. E.g., Minow, MllAing AU 1M Di.JJf:mIu , supra note: 2. at 230-SI. 
116. AI least one scholar has accused Minow or communitarian essentialism: _ Sheila 
Foster. eom"umity a7UI Idnllily in a PrulmDikrn nl1rld, 7 BERKEL.EY WOMEN'S LJ. 181,185 ( 1992) 
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IV. DIFFERENCE AS EQUALITY 
It would seem from the above a nalysis that diffe rence-based attacks on 
liberalism necessarily confl ict with eq uali ty. But this conclusion may be 100 
hasty, for a third conception of differcnce--one that departs in importalll 
ways from the views d iscussed thus fa r- now dominates the literature in 
cri tical race theory. In this section I consider whether this view of difference 
is any more equality-friendly than its counterparts. 
A. Difference in Critical Race Theory 
Advocates of this tllird vision of d ifference share much wi th advocates of 
poslmoclern difference theory. In particular, they accept the social<on-
suuction explanation for the origin of difference, and they are even more 
open than is Martha Minow about the connection between difference and 
hierarchy.!17 Difference, on this view, is the deliberate assignmen t of inferi-
ority, most prominently racial inferiority, by the white m.yority to racial 
minorities. IIS Scholars who adopt this view insist that we must recognize and 
institutionalizc, via the establishment of affirmalive group righlS, group 
differcnces that originated in racial oppression,I19 
("Whether imended Of not, Minow's reconsu'uction of "righu; language- through the recogni-
tion of their -inevitable rdational dimensions-leads her down a familiar path of embo.lcing 
-communitarianis1l1-) (citation omilled): i4. at 187 ("Thus, like advocates of the communi-
tatian "'on~mcnt. Minow envisions a communi ty. uni,'ersal in nalUre, where the -language of 
righu;" dntws each claimant into the community and -go.lnu; each a basis opporlUnity 10 
participate in Ihe process of communal debate-). 
117. Su, ' _g .. sources cited in nOle 51: _ also, from Ihe critical legal slUdies camp. Duncan 
Kennedy. A Cultural Plurulis/ Cas.! JIlT AJJirmatiTJt Actio" i" 1-4f<l1 AcGlltmill, 1990 Dul'.E LJ. 705, 
724 ("Though communities are dilTerem in wa~'li that are hest unrlerw).Jd UtTOugh the non-hi-
e.-archical, ncutral idca of culture ... some differences are not like that. Americans pursue 
their coHeetil'e and indil'itlual projecu; in a situation of group domination and group subordi-
nation. With respect to ... common measures of equality and inequality, we all recognize Ulat 
some group!l are enormously better off than othcrs-). 
118. This idea of difference as hierarchy is of COl1r~ sharcd by many feminisu and applied 
by them to thc analrsis of gcnder issues. Su, ~.g., MacKinnon, supra note 34. at 219 (~Difference 
is the I'clvet glol'c on the iron fist of [male] domination "). 
119. &t. t ,g., Roy L Brooks and Mary Jo Newborn. Critical Rm:t TNorY ami aassieaJ-UlMml 
Ciuil Rights .'\c!wlar.;hip: A Distimticm Without a Diffrrma?, 82 CAl.. L REv. 787, 804-44 (arguing 
that critical-race critiques of liberal discrimination law imply abolishment of Title VII): Sheila 
Foster. Diffm:na and Equality, SUprll note 2. at 154 (-At the core of a substantive concept of 
diversity. under an cguality paradigtll, should be a COlllmitmellt LO include indhiduals wiul 
differences that have been constructed i1l1o a basis for s)'litematic disad,,,ntage and exclu-
sion-): id. at 156 ("We mUSt establish institutional participatory patterns utat accept and valuc 
the conuibutions of those dilTerences t.hat hal'e been left out"); Harris, TIu!Jurisprodma of 
lUamstrurtiml. SUfJm note 2. at 761 ("Rauler tllan supporting assimilation to the dominant 
culture, the nt.ow social mm-emcnu hal'e demanded a recognition of uleir members' 'differ-
ence'"). 
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At the root of their proposed "politics of difference "120 is th idea that 
disadvantaged groups-most prominently racial minorities-have devel-
oped distinct methods of viewing the world and functioning within it that, 
as a matter of justice to those groups, must be preserved via the explicit 
importation into law of group rights and special treatment. 121 The goal is 
to promote eguality122-an equality based not on sameness, as in the liberal 
r ubric, but on racial differences. As critical-race theorist AngeJa Harris puts 
it, "This claim to equality based not on sameness but rather on difference 
is at the heart of th politics of difference. "123 
On a critical-race-theory view, Martha Minow's concern for the dangers 
of categorization actually overlooks the positive aspects of difference for 
those groups that have been marginalized. According to Sheila Foster, for 
exam pI , the danger of Minow's approach is that "Min ow leaves the power 
of transformation, this tim with respect to creating identities, in the hands 
of those already in power. "124 Foster argues that Minow's ocial relations 
theory constitutes an appeal to the already powerful to listen to the perspec-
tives of the marginalized , while Foster urges more action by the latter 
themselves to control the meaning and consequences of difference125: 
Categorization ... has been and continues to be a means by which those 
marginalized groups can empow r themselves by redefining the assigned 
meaning of difference. Categories, like rights, need to be rescued to allow 
those marginalized by essentialist categorization to empower themselves by 
altering, for themselves, the meaning of categories of difference imposed on 
them by those in power .... Marginalized groups can rescue categories by 
claiming those cat gories and by transforming negative meanings associated 
with th m in to positive ones that they create. The empowerment in this 
process of transformation comes not only in protesting the assigned mean-
ings of a cat gorical difference, but also in the recognition of the power to 
detlne that difference for th community of individuals embracing the diIIer-
ence. 126 
Condemning Minow's "seeming willingness to get rid of categories alto-
gether"127 and her "placement of the power of transformation in the hands 
ofth powerful, "128 Foster concludes that a universal c<?mmunity built upon 
J 20. T he term is u8ed by Ilarris, The ju.ispru.dcn.ce of Reconsl'ruction, supra note 2, at 159-66, 
and Young ,justiU! and the Politics of DijJerence, supra note 2. 
121. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, supra note 2, at 156-91 (ou tl ining tenets of 
"politics of difference" and describing specific group rights weh a pol itics would favor). 
122. FOSLer, Difference and Equality, supra nOte 2, aL 109, 110. 
123. Harris, Juris-prudence of Reconslruclirm, supra note 2, at 761 . 
124. Foster, supra note 11 6, at 191. 
125. Foster acknowledges that Minow creates discursive space for "a differen t analy~is" when 
·self-as8igned differences" are at Slake, id. at 191, but feds that Minow pays too little attention 
to this aspect of difference and fails to build it into her social re lations approach. Jd. at 191- 93. 
126. Foster, Difference and EquaJil)I, sltfrra note 2, at 192. 
127. ld. at 192. 
128. Jd. 
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~true equality" can be achieved only by "acknowledging and respecting the 
power of the marginalized to reclaim and transform the meaning of as-
signed categorization."129 Foster suggests that achieving racial equality will 
require us "to [both] deconstruct difference and allow marginalized groups 
to empower themselves through sameness." She urges groups that have 
been labeled different and inferior-such as racial minorities, gays and 
lesbians, and possibly others-to ~aff1rm sameness by defining a common 
identity on the fringes. "130 
Other critical race theorists echo this theme. Roy L. Brooks and Mary Jo 
ewborn, for example, explain that critical race theory (CRT) rejects the 
color-blind "formal equal opportunity" model (the vehicle for liberal hopes 
of racial equality) "for erroneously assuming the possibility and desirability 
of racial sameness, or equal legal treatment, and for ignoring legally signifi-
cant differences beaveen African Americans and whites. "131 They argue for 
an "asymmetrical model " of racial equality that will "assume the possibility 
and desirability of raciaL differences. " ParaLleling their depLoyment in theo-
ries of sexual equality, asymmetrical models of racial equality hold that the 
races are "often asymmetrically located in society" and reject "the notion 
that all [racial ] differences are likely to disappear, or even that they 
should. "132 Brooks and Newborn contend that "a degree of racial imbal-
ance-that is, racial empowermenl-must be tolerated in order to reach 
this state of racial balance ... . Racial empowerment is the only way to 
neutralize unconscious racial d iscrimination in American cuLture. By en-
couraging us to respect racial differences, racial empowerment val idates the 
life experiences of minorities. "\33 
Critical race theorist Angela Harris writes that CRT draws on insights 
from both the postmodern and liberal civil rights movements. 134 From the 
former, CRT inherits the conclusion that "racism is an inescapable feature 
of western culture, and race is always already inscribed in the most inno-
cent and neutral-seeming concepts. Even ideas like 'trut1, ' and 'justice' 
themselves are open to interrogations that reveal their complicity with 
power."J 35 From the latter, CRT takes "a commitment to a vision of libera-
tion from racism through right reason."\ SG oting the "tension " between 
129. Id. a t 193. 
130. Foster, supm note 11 6, at 193 (quoting f"om Alexander Chec. A Queer NalionaliS'1I4 
OUT/ LooK 15, 17 (Wimer 1991) ; see also Kennedy, mpra note 117, at 730 (discussing the 
"irreducible link of commonali ty in the experience of people of color: rich or poor, male or 
female, learned or ignorant, ail people of color al'e to some degree 'outsiders' in a society that 
is intensely color-consciolls and in which the hegemony of whites is overwhdming") (citation 
omitted) . 
131. Brooks and Newborn, .mpra nOte 11 9, at 800. 
132. ld. at 802. 
133. ld. at 802-03. 
134. Harris, supra nOte 2 , at 743. 
135. Id. at 743. 
136. {d. 
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these two planks of critical race theory,137 Harris nevertheless urges the 
movement to work within this tension and, via a 'J urisprudence of recon-
struction ," to "continua lly rebuild modernism in light of postmodern in-
sights. "138 Harris argues that CRT will be aided in this task by iLS 
engagement in the "politics of diffe r nce,"139 which she characterizes as 
containing a "dual commitment to e liminating oppression and celebrating 
differen e."140 "[T] he domestic politics of difference," continues Harris, 
"has focused on ... the constitution or reconstitution of the subordinated 
community and the transformation of th e dominant community."141 
B. Samen 55 Revis it d 
These ideas may have much political ulility1 42; the effort here is to isolate 
and ana lyze the concept of differe nce they employ. Two fundamental as ·er-
tions lie at its base . First, critical-race theorists urge groups that have been 
assigned th e label "different" a5 a badge of inferiority to emlJrace that differ-
ence in order to "reclaim " it. 143 Second, th eir goal appears to be to craft 
racial equality from such difference, to build a "politics of difference" that, 
grounded in the group 's intemalsameness of shared oppression, takes racial 
equali ty to be its foundational goal. 
1. Sameness from Dif erence? 
To reclaim difference in the name of equality, when dif~ rence has meant 
inequali ty, is to embrace an internal tension. But, consistent with the post-
modern conviction that individual character and personali ty are socially 
constructed, this th eory of difference proposes to resolve that tension by 
giving the power to transform the meaning of difference to those who have 
been labeled inferior. On this view reclaiming difference means both ac-
knowledging the negative impact of socially assigned difference on the 
members of disadvantaged groups, and transfo rming the negative content of 
the "diffe rence" label into an affirmation of group identity and group-based 
politi S.144 
137. !d. 
138. Ill. at 744. 
139. {d. 
140. {d. at 760. 
141. /d. 3 1 764. 
142. RT schola rs have ' mphasized Ihe importance of the ir work to lhe political fight for 
racialjusuce. See, e.g, Charles R. Lawrence Ill , The Ward (Ind tile River: Pedagogy as ScllOWrshilJ as 
StruggiR, 65 CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2239 (1992) (cducal-race scholarshi p "must ... respond to the 
immerliate needs of the oppressed and ubordinated"); Richard Delgado, On Telling StOlies in 
SdlOoi: A RPfJ/Y 10 /'·fII-un (llZd S IIPIT)" 46 VANO . L. REv. 665, 673-74 ("Outsider scholarship is often 
aimed no t at understanding the law, but at changing it"); Brooks and Newborn, .mpm no te 119, 
at 844 (citing Lawrence and Delgado for these poin ts). 
143. Foster, D'f!errr,.a tlmi Fqu(l/il), SUI)'" note 2, a t 193. 
144. Ye generally Foster, supm no te 11 6; Foster, Di[fermce a"lu/ Equ{llity, supra nOte 2. 
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This view is in some meaningful way antiliberal; it views liberal individu-
alism and individual rights as masks for white domination of minoritie , 
while it celebrates the lib rating potential of group identity and group 
rights. It also deep ns th conception of group id ntity beyond that con-
tained in liberal pluralism, which envisions "interest groups" that are con-
structed by preformed individuals who engage in collective behavior only 
as a result of preexisting, di tinct int rests that happen to coincide. 145 The 
"di£ference"-based view in ists on the primacy of group identity as a fac tor 
in constructing individual identity, and on th importance of membership 
in societally powerful groups. 146 
Upon examination, how ver, this third view of difference collapses of its 
own weight. Consider first that the acquisition of the power to transform 
meaning must be justified by a purpose other than (or at least in addition to) 
the mere effects of power-holding. The CRT conception of difference 
focuses upon the raw experience of power as transformative, but doe n't 
itself answer the central question of what values that power will serve. Toward 
what end, in other words, do differ nce advocates argue for the reclamation 
and reinforcement of diff rence via the simultaneous transformation of its 
content into a positive one? If CRT theod ts were asked to state the purpose 
of the "politics of difference," they would surely answer "the a hievement 
of racial justice." And what constitutes racial ju tice? The usual an wer i , 
"equality between the races. "147 The new and tran formed content of differ-
ence is meant, perhaps, to give positive meaning to th phrase" parate but 
equal"- to affirm the equality of groups whose relation hip ha long been 
that of oppressor and oppressed but which are now to be treated as simply 
145. See, e.g., Sunstein , supra. note 106 (describing liberal pluralism in these terms); Cynthia 
V. Ward, The Limits of Liberal Republicanism: Why GrollJrBased Remedu.s and Rtpllblican Citiunship 
Don', Mix, 91 CotUM. L. REv. 581 (1991) (contrasting liberal pluralism with communilarian 
republicanism) . 
146. See, e.g., Foster, Difference and F.qllaMv, slIpra note 2, a 158-59 ("The dominant culture 
has exerci8ed its power to develop social and cultural defmitions for those deemed outside of 
that culture. Conseq uently, the story of Blacks and other minorities has been created and told 
primarily by "/hites, with little contribution from tlle subjects tllemsclvcs. Blacks and other 
minotities have been effectively rendered 'invisible' not because Whites cannot see them, but 
because 'whi tes see primali ly what a white dominant culrure has train d them to see ' and 
because the Black stories ' simply do not register ' ''); Kenn edy, supra note 11 7, a t 722 ("An 
important human reality is the experience of defining oneself as 'a member of a group' in this 
sO'ong sense of sharing goals and a discursive practice ''); id. at 723 ("Communitie have 
cultures. T his means that indi,iduals have traiLS lhat are neither geneti ally d termined nOr 
volun tarily chosen, but rather consciously and unconsciously taught through communit), life. 
Communi t), life forms customs and habi ts, capacities to produce li nguistic and o ther perform-
ances, and individual understandings f good and bad, true and false, worthy and unworthy"); 
Young, iustice and the Politics of Difference, SlI/Jra note 2, a t 163 ('"Today and for the foreseeable 
futu re societies are certainly structured by groups, and some are pri\~leged wh il others are 
oppressed") . 
147. But see Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363, 373-74 (1992) (arguing that 
African Americans should abandon quest for racial equa li t), and focus on bettering their 
situation in society); Derrick Bell , f ACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 12 (1992) ("Black people will never gain equali ty in this country") (emphasis omitled)_ 
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different from, but nev rtheless equal to, each other. But "equal" in what 
sense? The creation of group-defining "sam ness" from shared oppres-
sion-or from cultural traditions that originated in shared oppression-ac-
tually 'relies upon the ontinuing existence of difference between groups. 
Difference from the other becomes the basis for sameness within the group, 
for the very definition of the group as a group. 
On what basis, th n, can group A argue that its memb rs should be 
treated equally to group B? Group definitions that rely upon the shared 
"difference" of oppres ion might create community and a sense of equali ty 
within a group, but cannot justify the establishment of equality between 
group. If the goal is to win equality for one's group vis-a.-vis all other groups 
in society, some other justification of the intergroup equality principle must 
be advanced. 148 I submit that this justification can only be grounded in 
ameness-not only the samenes of group members to each other, but the 
sameness of all groups to all other groups, or in other words, the sameness 
of all human beings. 
2. Can Equalil)1 Be Based on Difference? 
At one level th critical-race view of difference simply constitutes an argu-
ment for a distributive principle of equality. Difference theorists argue for 
equal distribution of resources and power to groups whose subordination 
previously compris d the steps in the social ladd r. Once again, however, 
this principle of distribution must b justified at a deeper level-must 
answer the question of why we sh ould distribute power equally. 
At the level of justification this strain of difference theory is incoherent. 
CRT scholars reject the liberal idea thal rationali ty and autonomy are 
the proper bases on which to construct legal rights, arguing either that 
thos ideas are innately biased in favor of the white male elite and designed 
to perpetuate its dominanc , or that autonomy and rationality are ephem-
eral to start with. Instead, radical theorists argue for equality based on 
difference, I<19 and although this might work at the distributiv level-it is at 
least theoretically possible to d cide which "differences" have created rele-
vant groups and to distribut money, j obs, and/or political positions equally 
among all groups deemed r I vant by the agreed-upon criteria of differ-
ence-it is completely unintelligible at the justifi atory level, a fault that 
leaves difference theory without any equality-based answer to th question 
148. Relalional feminiSl lheory also faces this problem. Some of Robin 'West\ work, for 
e ample, suggests lhat women are profoundly different from men al. every level. See, e,g., WeSl. 
;ulna note I , al 17 ("According to the vasllile,"alure on d ifference now being developed by 
cultura l fem inists, women's cognitive de,'elopmenl, literary sensibility, aesthetic tasle, and 
psychological development, no less than our analomy, are all fundamentally different from 
men ·s. , ., The most significalll aspecl of our difference, though, is surely Lh<: moral differ-
enc<:"), If Lhis i true, women 's equalilY lO men (ralhe r than preferential or inferior treatment) 
requ ires an independent argumenl showing why women, although so very different, neverthe-
less possess equal worlh. 
149, See, e.g" Harri s, supra note 2, at 761, 
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of why we should di tribute power equalJy among racial groups. To the 
extent difference theory demonstrates the existence of radical, irr ducible 
differenc among groups, it undercuts th justification for working toward 
equali ty for those groups. Why, in hort, should we treat people as equals if 
they in fact are irreducibly different? At the very least, an answer to this 
question requires an analysis of what differenc s exist between group and 
some conclusion that, although different, the groups' values, identities, 
purposes, etc., are neverthe less equal. 0 such discussion appears in radical 
difference theory. 
3. Equalit)1 without Sameness? 
There are of course justifications for political principles of equal distribu-
tion that do not rely on the establishm ent of sameness among all persons. 
One could argue, for example, that treating people as equal is necessary 
to preserve law and order, or to maximize happiness or minimize suffer-
ing-a utilitarian view. But such justifications capture neith r th spirit nor 
the pronounced beliefs of radical difference theory. The p ace-and-order 
rationale is both empirically dubiou - law and order have been pre erved 
for long periods in hierarchical socie ties and dramatically violated in egali-
tarian ones- and politically uninspiring. It shrinks discussions about the 
proper vision of social justice into squabbles over the comparative virtues of 
various bureaucratic peacekeeping stra tegie . At I ast some utilitarian views 
may b similarly limited, as critical-race theorist Derrick Bell 's writings 
illustrate. On a straightforward reading of Profe or Bell 's work, one could 
reasonably conclude that a uti litarian approach to racial justice would result 
in the re tention ofa rigid racial hierarchy in the United States. Bell believes 
that subordinating blacks is an essential part of the white majority's identity 
in this country, and in fact that whites have such a strong preference in favor 
of oppressing blacks that they will never allow racial hierarchy to end. 150 
If this is correct, calls for racial justice rely at their peril on utilitarian 
rationales. 
V. CONCLUSION: DIFFERENCE AND DOUBLESPEAK 
It would seem that any acceptable justification of equali ty requir the 
establishment of orne descriptive sameness among people. t the moment 
one asserts that rw important commonali ty of persons can be established or 
150. Seegenerally Bell . Racial Realisl1~ supra nOle 147; Bell, FACES AT THE BoTTOM O'-THE Wtl.L, 
supra nOle 147; see al50 Brooks and ewborn, supra nOle 119, al 798 (ra ism is "normal science" 
in the United States); Harri s, s!ll;ra nOle 2, at 749 ("Derrick Bell argues lhal racism is a 
permanent feature of lhe American landscape, not somelhing we can Lhrow off in a magic 
moment of emancipation . And in a moment of deep pessimism, Richard Delgado's fictional 
fd end 'Rodrigo Crenshaw' has suggesLed lhal racism is an inuinsic reature or lhe 'The 
Enligillenment' iLSeir-) (citations omitted). 
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can legitimately form the basis of citizenship, one is left without a rich 
defense of egalitarianism. 
The assault on "equality as sameness" must take onc of two routes. Either 
its consists of a charge that the wrong sameness has grounded politics and 
law, or it implies the rejection of equality altogether. Tn the first instance, 
difference theorists are left to find and defend some new commonality (a 
task they have so far rejected as "essentialist") 15 1, in which case the current 
focus on the "difference" question ought to be transcended in favor of an 
open debate over which vision of equality is the best. In the second instance, 
difference advocates are left to discover an entirely new, nonequality-based 
structure for law and politics. If political and legal equality are not proper 
goals given the "differcnce" critique, what should be our goals? In the name 
of what principle should we worry about differences in power between the 
races and genders? In an environment of irreconcilable "difference," how 
should we make justice-based arguments for change, or even think about 
justice itself? Scholars who deploy radical views of difference in order to 
argue for social justice must bear the burden of answering these questions. 
151. See gtmemlly Harris, su.pra nOle 40; Elizabeth Spelman, supra nOle 46. 
